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Spaniards' Long March Towards Europe

JUAN DíEZ-NICOLÁS

THE AIM TO BE EUROPEANS

Spaniards have long felt the need to be recognized as Europeans. After a period of more than a century of no participation in the most important European events, Spaniards needed to feel they were part of Europe and no longer different. Spain's neutrality in the First World War and Second World War, which were both mainly European wars, added to the fact that it had not participated in the previous war of 1870, and to the 40 years of greater or smaller isolation during the Franco regime, makes it necessary to go back to Napoleon's wars in order to find the last significant implication of Spain in European affairs.

Since the 1960s, and even more since the 1970s, Spaniards began to express more and more frequently and intensively their desire not to be different, and their aim to be, like other Europeans, fully integrated into Europe and, in general, the Western world. Certainly, Spain had already been admitted to the United Nations in November 1950, and therefore had become a member of all the international organizations that were part of the UN, such as UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), WLO (World Labour Organization) and others. It is also a fact that in 1953 Spain had signed a treaty with the United States for the joint use of some military bases in Spain, as well as a new treaty with the Holy See. Spain had even been a member, since the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) inception in 1961, of this prestigious group of developed countries.

Even during the 1970s, however, Spain was banned from admission to other European 'clubs': the Council of Europe and the Common Market (as it was then named), as well as from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). During the 1960s and 1970s supporters as well as opponents to the Franco regime agreed on their desire to see

Spain admitted to those three international bodies, though for very different reasons. Supporters of the Franco regime believed Spain's admission to the three exclusive 'clubs' would mean recognition and acceptance by the international (and particularly the European) community, of the regime born out of the Civil War (1936–39), as well as the definitive legitimization of a regime that exhibited a peculiar 'organic' democracy. Opponents of the Franco regime desired the incorporation of Spain to the three international organizations as an indirect way of achieving the political changes needed to abandon the old authoritarian structures and restore the basic civic rights and freedoms, especially the legalization of political parties and labour unions, as well as the calling of free democratic elections, thus restoring democracy in Spain.¹

When Franco died in November 1975, and once civil rights and freedoms were restored during the transition to democracy, Spain was admitted to the three international (and mainly European) organizations. It was first admitted to the Council of Europe, immediately after the first democratic elections of June 1977. Admission to the Council of Europe was always considered a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to acceptance to the more restricted and exclusive Common Market (thereafter European Economic Community and at present European Union). When Spain was admitted to the Council of Europe in November 1977, the organization had 20 members, whereas the number of member countries in the EEC was only nine. In December 1981 Spain was admitted to NATO, and although Spanish leftist parties (particularly the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* [PSOE] and the *Partido Comunista de España* [PCE]) questioned that decision at the time, the PSOE government of 1986 called for a referendum to maintain Spain within NATO, the result being a slight difference in favour of keeping Spain in (52 per cent voted 'yes', and 40 per cent voted 'no'; the rest were blank or invalid votes). The incorporation of Spain, years later, into the military structure of NATO produced little public controversy except among the *Izquierda Unida* (IU) party (the heir of the PCE). The admission of Spain to the European Economic Commission took place in 1986, 24 years after the first official petition by the Spanish Government (which was presented in 1962), and 16 years after the signature (in 1970) of a preferential treaty of the EEC with Spain that, contrary to European expectations, proved to be extremely favourable to the Spanish economy.

It is no surprise that, after such a long waiting period for full integration into Europe, Spaniards have developed a very pro-European orientation, probably the most European of all Europeans. Only recently have some signs of discontent begun to arise, although they are still far from any significant 'Euro scepticism' current of opinion. On the contrary, as will be shown below, a high consensus in favour of European integration is evident in all aspects that may be considered.

As early as 1966, only four years after Spain's first official petition for admission into the Common Market, a survey conducted by the – at that time – recently established *Instituto de la Opinión Pública* (Public Opinion Institute – IOP)² showed a relative majority in favour of Spain joining the European Common Market. In fact, 60 per cent of the population 21 years of age and over did not have an opinion. Thirty-three per cent, however, answered that the solution to Spain's economic problems was membership in the Common Market, whereas four per cent were in favour of economic autarchy and three per cent preferred an economic union with Latin America. In 1968 those not having an opinion had dropped to only 33 per cent, whereas the number in favour of joining the Common Market had grown to 58 per cent. That same year 41 per cent were in favour of Spain being integrated into the United States of Europe, even at the cost of 'losing some prerogatives as an independent state', and only 22 per cent opposed such integration. During the 1970s many different IOP surveys showed a persistent proportion of between 70–75 per cent in favour of Spain joining the Common Market. The number of those who expected benefits for the Spanish economy with respect to its industry, agriculture, or labour was usually between five and ten times as large as the number of those who expected negative consequences. That was also true with respect to politics, culture, trade, and tourism.

It may be interesting to note that a survey conducted by the CIS in 1983 asked respondents to mention what they considered the three most important issues in Spain's foreign policy.³ The aggregate results were as follows: entrance into the European Common Market (50 per cent), relations with Latin America and recovery of Gibraltar (both 32 per cent), presence of Spain in international organizations (26 per cent), good neighbours policy toward France and Portugal (18 per cent), reinforcement of relations with the Third World (11 per cent), and good relations with Communist (European) countries, cordial relations with neighbours in North Africa, and relations with NATO (all under ten per cent).⁴

During the first few years after admission to the European Economic Community, however, Spaniards could not perceive any benefits for themselves, although they continued to expect them in the future, especially with respect to the national economy. Thus, in different surveys conducted by ASEP (*Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos* – Political, Economic and Sociological Analysis) during the late 1980s,⁵ 40 per cent of respondents agreed that entrance into the EEC had been negative for most Spaniards, 48 per cent did not agree that entrance had improved the standard of living of Spaniards, 57 per cent agreed that it would be very positive for most Spaniards, and 63 per cent agreed that the EEC would be a first step toward political unification in Europe.

In summary, Spaniards had long awaited integration into the European Economic Community because they wanted to lose the feeling of isolation that, to a greater or lesser degree, they had experienced for several decades during the Franco regime, and they were anxious to prove they were fully Europeans. That may be one of the main reasons for the pervasive pro-European attitude of Spaniards that is found in all surveys, as if the expression of strong wishes to join Europe and high expectations of benefits could make the dream come true. Although the high positive expectations did not seem to materialize during the first years of membership, however, Spaniards did not dismay, and continued to expect high benefits at the same time that they recognized their expectations had not yet become real. Optimism about the consequences of joining the ECC has been the main support for Spaniards' pro-European attitudes.

According to Díez-Medrano (2003) studies on European integration generally fail to differentiate between explanations for the behaviour of the countries' political elites and the attitudes of the population. The studies lack sufficient empirical support, and they fail to link historical and structural processes and elites' views to the general population's attitudes. In addition, he also points out the scarcity of studies on Spain's process of European integration.

The analysis that follows focuses only on Spain's public opinion with respect to the process of European integration, and contributes empirical findings, mainly based on time series data for a period of 12 years, that may be useful to test, at least partially, some of the main hypotheses that have been advanced to explain Spaniards' support for this process.

SPANIARDS' EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The project of a supranational identity community centred on the Spanish-speaking world, as promoted by the writer Ramiro de Maeztu (1931) among others, lost whatever meaning was left since the movements for independence in Latin America soon after the Spanish civil war (Díez Medrano, 2003). This has been reflected in surveys conducted since 1991, which show that a very small percentage of respondents agree with the statement that ‘Spain is the Mother land of Ibero-America, and everything should be subordinated to her role as mother, even economic interests’. In short, Latin America was part of Spain’s history, but Europe has not only been part of her history, it is also part of her present and future.

While identifying themselves as Europeans rather than as members of a *Hispanidad* community, however, Spaniards have maintained strong affective bonds with Latin America and Latin Americans that compete with those with Europe and the Europeans.⁶ Because of Spain’s long colonial presence in Latin America, the traumatic effects of the loss of Cuba and Puerto Rico in 1898, and huge migration flows from Spain to Latin America early in the twentieth century, it is easy to understand why Spaniards have been traditionally positively oriented toward Latin America. Although a common language, history, religion, and culture between Spain and Latin America have created very strong ties, however,

TABLE 1
INDEX* OF SENTIMENTS TOWARD GROUPS OF COUNTRIES

	I -91	I -92	I -93	I -94	I -95	IV -96	II -97	IV -98	IV -99	IV -00	IV -01	III -02
European Union	178	161	157	163	139	146	154	148	152	159	159	171
Latin America	161	142	145	150	143	144	148	143	147	155	156	156
East Europe	151	134	134	136	123	125	131	130	126	140	144	147
North America (US and Canada)	122	113	118	123	118	116	122	123	115	134	135	132
Arab countries of North Africa	112	104	122	118	108	108	110	107	111	119	117	107

Note: * The index has been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents that show favourable attitudes and the proportion that show unfavourable attitudes, adding 100 to make the index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1991 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid and BBK Foundations.)

TABLE 2
EVALUATION* OF NATIONALS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES

	I -91	I -92	I -93	I -94	I -95	IV -96	II -97	IV -98	IV -99	IV -00	IV -01	III -02
Argentineans	6.3	6.2	6.2	6.5	6.4	6.5	6.3	6.4	6.2	6.3	6.5	6.4
Italians	6.3	5.9	6.0	6.2	6.0	6.1	6.0	6.2	6.0	6.2	6.4	6.3
Portuguese	5.5	5.5	5.8	6.0	5.9	6.0	5.8	6.1	5.9	6.1	6.4	6.2
Germans	5.6	5.4	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.6	5.8	5.5	5.8	5.9	5.9
French	5.3	5.2	5.6	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.8	5.8	5.9
British	4.9	4.9	5.4	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.5	5.7
North Americans	5.2	5.1	5.3	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.1	5.5	5.5	5.3
Moroccans	4.1	4.1	4.6	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	4.7

Note: * The scale used varies from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1991 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

geography, a whole history of political, religious, and economic alliances and confrontations between Spain and the rest of Europe have created even stronger ties.

Survey data collected annually since 1991 by ASEP demonstrate that Spaniards' sentiments towards the European Union and Latin America are similar and higher than those towards any other group of countries,⁷ although there is a small but stable difference in favour of the European Union (see Table 1). When the question of Spanish sentiment refers to nationals instead of countries, however, Latin Americans (as represented here by Argentineans) are consistently better evaluated than nationals from any European country (as represented by Italians, Portuguese, Germans, French and British) (see Table 2).

All European nationals are consistently better evaluated than North Americans and Moroccans (with the exception of the British, less valued than North Americans in three years, and the French, less valued than North Americans in 1998). It may be added that when other Latin American nationals have been included, as the Mexicans were in 1991, they were given a better grade than all European nationals, and when all European Union nationals have been included (as in 1992, 1993, and 1994), they all received lower grades than Argentineans but higher grades than North Americans.

When the question refers to countries, the frame of reference seems to be based on economic and political considerations, but when the

question asks about nationals, the frame of reference seems to be based more on affective dimensions that have to do with sharing a common culture. This apparent contradiction or, rather, indecision, manifests itself in many other questions. Thus, in the 12 surveys conducted since 1991, a high majority of respondents agree with the statement that ‘The Ibero-American Community of Nations is certainly a great idea, but Spain is in Europe, and her place is essentially in Europe’. A significant percentage also agrees, however, that ‘Spain is geographically in Europe, but because of her language, history and tradition, she should be linked more especially to Ibero-America’.

The fact that Spaniards feel culturally, historically, and emotionally close to Latin America does not imply any real intention of integration. The idea of a Spanish Commonwealth equivalent to the British Commonwealth was abandoned long ago, though it is also true that, because of the restoration of the Spanish Crown in 1976, Spain maintains a symbolic pre-eminence in Latin American summits and continues to receive some sort of special recognition. In reciprocity Spain has accepted the role of mediator between Latin America and the European Union, at

TABLE 3
OPINION ON THE MEANING OF BEING EUROPEAN

TOTAL	I-92 (1,200) %	I-93 (1,200) %	I-94 (1,200) %	I-95 (1,200) %	IV-96 (1,200) %	II-97 (1,213) %	IV-98 (1,204) %	IV-99 (1,214) %	IV-00 (1,210) %	IV-01 (1,209) %	III-02 (1,220) %
To consider oneself as European	24	23	25	19	20	22	25	25	28	20	26
To live and work in a European country for more than 5 years	16	17	14	20	22	16	15	17	14	19	20
To be born in in a European country	50	49	49	52	49	50	49	50	48	52	46
To have certain physical and cultural traits	6	4	4	3	4	4	3	3	4	2	2
DK/NA	4	6	7	6	5	7	9	6	7	6	5

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1992 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

times more symbolically than in practice. It is also true that since the late 1980s Spain has acquired a predominant position as investor in many Latin American countries.

For most Spaniards, to be European is to be born in a European country, although one out of five answer that it is 'to consider oneself as European'. The same proportion also thinks it is 'to live and work in a European country'. Only an insignificant minority believes being European has anything to do with 'certain physical or cultural traits' (see Table 3).

Being among the least xenophobic and racist of all Europeans (Díez-Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001a), it is only natural that Spaniards should pay so little attention to physical or cultural traits when deciding who is or is not European. The proportion mentioning that option, small as it has been since the beginning, has even declined steadily to an almost negligible two per cent. On the contrary, the land where one is born seems to be the most important basis for defining someone as European, to the point that about half of the sample chooses that option every year.

The length of time that Spaniards had to wait in order to be admitted to the European Union probably accounts for the favourable attitude Spaniards show toward the EU. Less than ten per cent of

TABLE 4
RESPONDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EUROPEAN UNION

TOTAL	I-95 (1,200) %	IV-96 (1,200) %	II-97 (1,213) %	IV-98 (1,204) %	IV-99 (1,214) %	IV-00 (1,210) %	IV-01 (1,209) %	III-02 (1,220) %
Very much in favour	5	6	5	4	5	5	4	5
Quite in favour	32	31	33	28	32	35	31	40
Somewhat in favour	21	22	26	29	33	30	35	33
Neither in favour nor against	26	24	18	27	20	20	18	16
Somewhat against	7	8	5	4	5	3	6	3
Quite against	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Very much against	1	1	1	1	1	—	*	*
DK/NA	6	6	9	5	3	5	4	2
Index*	147	147	157	155	162	166	162	173

Note: * The index has been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents that show favourable attitudes and the proportion that show unfavourable attitudes, adding 100 to make the index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1995 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

respondents usually answer that they are somewhat against, quite against, or very much against the European Union, a proportion so small that it puts Spain in one of the lowest positions of all European countries in terms of the significance and weight of the so-called 'Eurosceptics' – certainly a great distance from the United Kingdom. As a matter of fact, the pro-European attitude has grown over time, reaching an all-time high in 2002 (probably as a consequence of the Spanish Presidency of the European Council during the first semester of this year).

In fact, the two most important parties, *Partido Popular* (PP) and PSOE, have never shown any significant differences with respect to integration in the EU, as they did with respect to NATO in the past. Even the IU, heir to the former PCE, has been in favour of Spain joining the European Union, though at times it may have expressed some criticisms about specific issues, similarly to regional or nationalist parties. Thus in the 2002 survey, the proportions of respondents who show favourable attitudes toward the EU were 78 per cent among PP voters, 73 per cent among PSOE voters, and 70 per cent among IU voters.⁸ Nobody has ever dared to really hold up the flag against the construction of Europe, nor even the extreme left or the extreme right. Consensus among political parties, labour unions, and all kinds of interest groups has always been almost unanimous in supporting the integration of Spain into the EU (Alvarez-Miranda 1996), one of the rare issues where such a consensus has been reached.

Three variables measuring the attitudes of Spaniards toward the European Union were included in the ASEP surveys: sentiments toward the European Union (a five-point scale measuring favourable–unfavourable attitudes towards different groups of countries, as shown in Table 1), attitudes towards the European Union (a seven-point scale measuring favourable–unfavourable attitudes toward the EU only, as indicated in Table 4), and degree of identification with the European Union (an 11-point scale measuring the degree of identification with the European Union as well as with the region where the respondent lives, and with Spain, as shown in Table 5). The correlation coefficients among the three variables range between 0.27 and 0.32, all three being statistically significant at the 0.001 level. A main component analysis showed that attitudes toward the European Union (the seven-point scale) are the best measure of the three.

Two regression models have then been constructed having as dependent variables the attitudes toward the European Union, and as

independent variables a group of attitudinal variables and a group of socio-demographic variables respectively. The attitudinal variables included the individual's frequency of reading international news in the press, frequency of travelling abroad, self-appraised degree of information about the European Union, perception of relatives' and friends' attitudes toward the European Union, perception of mass media's attitudes toward the European Union, and knowledge of foreign languages. These variables explained 14 per cent of the total variance in the attitudes of Spaniards toward the European Union, and the independent variable that contributed more to this explanation was the respondent's perception of mass media's attitudes towards the European Union, followed by the perception of relatives' and friends' attitudes and the self-appraised degree of information about the European Union, and by the frequency of travelling abroad. All four relationships are positive.

As for the socio-demographic variables, they included the respondent's age, educational level, self-placement on a seven-point left-right scale, self-placement on a five-point scale of Spanish-nationalist sentiments, monthly household income, social position as defined by Galtung (1976) (to construct a nine-point index measuring centre-periphery placement), socio-economic status (on the basis of the person's education, household income, occupational status, and household equipment), exposure to information (an index constructed on the basis of newspapers read, broadcasted information programmes listened to, and television information programmes watched), and Inglehart's post-materialism index (a six-point scale) (Inglehart 1977b, 1990, 1997). The explanatory power of this model was only three per cent of the total variance on the dependent variable, and the only significant relationship with attitudes towards the European Union was monthly household income. These results confirm the findings of other studies.⁹

The results therefore also confirm the positive relationship of income and voting for conservative parties with attitudes toward the European Union (Gabel 1998). They also support Inglehart's cognitive mobilization hypothesis (Inglehart 1977a) in which individuals with more knowledge about the European Union (especially if the media portray the European Union favourably) will be more positively oriented towards it. Thus, the correlation coefficients between the individual's self-appraised degree of information on the European Union and the individual's perception of mass media orientation towards it are positively and significantly related to

attitudes toward the European Union ($r = .226$ and $.265$ respectively). However, the Spanish data do not support Wessel's (1995) hypothesis about the relationship between the individual's left-right self-placement and attitudes towards the European Union, probably because of the very favourable attitudes of Spaniards toward the EU regardless of political orientation. Neither do the data support Inglehart's hypothesis about the positive relationship between post-materialism and attitudes towards the European Union (the relationship is not statistically significant). In any case, as Díez-Medrano has remarked, these models usually explain a very small effect on attitudes toward the European Union (Gabel's model explains 16 per cent of the variance at most, and the model used here explains 14 per cent of the variance). Quoting Deflem and Pampel (1996), he concludes that 'a person's country of residence remains by far the best predictor of attitudes towards European integration' (Díez-Medrano 2003).

As expected, Spaniards identify themselves more strongly with Spain and the Autonomous Community where they live than with Europe. Traditionally, Spaniards have identified themselves primarily with the place where they live (the town or city), showing some kind of 'localism', but since 1978, when the Autonomous Communities (Regions) acquired constitutional recognition and more powers than many of their equivalent administrative subdivisions, even in federal states, Spaniards have experienced a reshaping of their identities, to the extent that identification with the Autonomous Community exceeded in many regions (especially the Basque Country, Navarra, Galicia, Catalonia, among others) their identification with Spain. In some cases, like the Basque Country, identification with the Autonomous Community is linked to separatist or independent

TABLE 5
DEGREE OF IDENTIFICATION* WITH SPAIN,
THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY, AND EUROPE

	I-93	I-94	I-95	IV-96	II-97	IV-98	IV-99	IV-00	IV-01	III-02
SPAIN	8.2	8.1	8.2	8.1	8.1	7.9	8.0	7.9	8.0	8.0
Autonomous Community	8.3	8.2	8.0	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.9	7.8	7.9	8.0
EUROPE	6.7	6.7	6.4	6.1	6.2	6.2	6.4	6.1	6.4	6.7

Note: * The scale used varies from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1993 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid and BBK Foundations.)

feelings (about 25 per cent of the Basques feel that way) (Díez-Nicolás 1999), but in most cases it only reflects a newly acquired circle of identification perfectly compatible with Spanish identity (Díez-Medrano and Gutierrez 2001). As the novelty of the Autonomous Community is reduced, the compatibility of the local, regional, and national identities is more and more salient. The European identity, however, no matter how European Spaniards claim they are, is still a long way off (see Table 5).

In a sense, one could argue that Spaniards' aim to be European results more from their will to avoid being left out of Europe, as a question of pride, than because they really wanted to integrate and dissolve themselves into a European identity. It is likely that Spaniards want to be Europeans without renouncing their Spanish and regional identities, something that is coherent with their limited geographical mobility, not only toward Europe, but even towards different regions and localities within Spain. Three out of four Spaniards 18-years and older live in the same province in which they were born and in the same province they lived in when they were young (Díez-Nicolás 1999: 15). Besides, only about 19 per cent of Spaniards 18-years and older say they can speak a foreign language (not including regional vernacular languages), 46 per cent have never travelled abroad (as a matter of fact, less than ten per cent admit travelling 'frequently' or 'very frequently' abroad), and only five per cent answer that it is 'very likely' or 'quite likely' that they will go abroad to work within the next ten years (ASEP's III-02 survey). The geographical position of Spain at one extreme of Europe, the natural barrier of the Pyrenees, the great regional heterogeneity and diversity, not only with respect to the natural or physical environment, but also with respect to language, culture, and traditions, probably explains the 'extreme localism' of the population, even though for two and a half decades (1950–75), internal and external migrations forced many people to travel away from their homeland. Nevertheless, it is also true that most migrants (especially those who went to Europe) returned after a few years, and they returned to their homeland, 'to their own', as they would say.

Spaniards have participated in the elections for the European Parliament in no negligible proportion. In 1987, when the first European elections after admission were held in Spain, participation rate was 69 per cent. It dropped to 55 per cent in the regular elections of 1989, only three percentage points below the European average. Participation rate increased to 59 per cent in 1994 (two percentage

points above the European average), however, and to 64 per cent in 1999 (15 percentage points above the European average). The trend seems to reflect an increasing interest of Spaniards in European elections, as shown not only in contrast with the European average (which is clearly declining), but also with respect to turnout in Spanish general elections (69 per cent in 1989, 77 per cent in 1993, 78 per cent in 1996 and 69 per cent in 2000). Thus, participation in the last European elections of 1999 was only five percentage points below participation in the last Spanish legislative elections of 2000, a difference that is certainly very small when compared to the differences between European and national elections in other member states of the European Union. Turnout recall in the last European elections of 1999 is better explained by the regression model based on the socio-demographic variables mentioned before (the model explains six per cent of the total variance of attitudes towards the European Union) than by the model based on the attitudinal variables also mentioned previously (the model explains only three per cent of the total variance). Age and social position and leftist self-placement are the best predictors of turnout recall, all negatively related to it, implying that those in the social periphery and self-placed in the right, as well as the young, are more likely to have voted in the last European elections. Besides, though the attitudinal regression model explains such a small proportion of the variance, the individual's appraised degree of information on the European Union is the best predictor of attitudes toward the European Union.

GOALS, HOPES AND FEARS RELATED TO INTEGRATION INTO THE EU

What are the goals that Spaniards want the European Union to reach? What do they expect from the EU? What do they fear from EU? Survey data accumulated during the past 12 years seem to provide some tentative answers to these questions.

Taking the year 2000 as a referential date (2005 after the 1999 survey), questions have been posed since 1991 to find out whether Spaniards wanted the European government or the Spanish government to take responsibility for certain policies. From 1991 to 1994 a majority of respondents were clearly in favour of the single European currency, the Central European Bank, and a European Armed Forces. Public opinion was also moderately in favour of the European government deciding on a joint foreign policy and on the most

TABLE 6

AGREEMENT-DISAGREEMENT INDEX WITH RESPECT TO WHICH GOVERNMENT,
EUROPEAN OR NATIONAL, SHOULD DECIDE ON CERTAIN
POLICIES BY THE YEAR 2000

	I -91	I -92	I -93	I -94	I -95	IV -96	II -97	IV -98	IV -99	IV -00	IV -01	III -02
Most important political decisions	115	125	119	113	104	99	98	103	93	104	96	109
Tax policies	105	115	112	106	102	93	96	99	80	99	91	95
European	121	125	128	122	119	115	114	116	109	116	110	117
Armed Forces												
Foreign policy and relations	115	123	123	115	112	106	104	104	102	106	102	109
A single currency	145	149	149	141	131	131	135	-	-	-	-	-
A single Central Bank	-	125	134	121	109	106	107	-	-	-	-	-

Note: * The index has been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents that agree and the proportion that disagree, adding 100 to make the index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1991 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Cava de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

important political decisions, and it was only moderately in favour of the European government deciding on tax policy (see Table 6).

Since 1995, however, support has decreased slightly until 2001 with respect to all those policies, though it has remained quite high with respect to the common single currency and not so high with respect to the joint European Armed Forces. A general recovery of all indicators seems to have taken place in 2002, probably due to the Spanish presidency during the first semester. Since the EU decided in 1997 to adopt the euro as the common single currency, and given that Spain was among the group of countries that first implemented this decision, from 1998 onward the survey asked a question regarding Spaniards' satisfaction with that decision. Results have shown a consistent 50–55 per cent who consider it a very good or good decision, compared to less than ten per cent who consider it a bad or very bad decision. Opinions have become slightly more favourable, however, toward keeping the most important political decisions and tax policies within the authority of the Spanish government. There

TABLE 7
TRUST* IN INSTITUTIONS

	I-95	IV-96	II-97	IV-98	IV-99	IV-00	IV-01	IV-02
1. The Crown	7.2	7.3	7.1	7.0	6.7	7.1	6.8	6.4
2. European Union	5.2	5.7	5.6	5.4	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.5
3. Autonomous Community Government	4.7	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.6	5.2	5.0
4. Spanish Government	3.9	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.6	4.9	4.7
5. Armed Forces	5.3	5.2	5.5	5.3	5.1	5.4	5.2	5.1
6. Public Administration	4.2	4.5	4.8	4.5	4.4	4.9	4.7	4.7
7. Courts of Justice	4.5	4.3	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.3

Note: * The scale used varies from 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1995 to 1996 were collected for CIRES, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

also seems to be a great of deal controversy about what government, European or Spanish, should decide on a common foreign policy. It seems that, as Spaniards have gained experience in knowing what it means to be part of the European Union, initial thoughts about transferring rapidly most policies to a central European government have become a little more cautious. This does not mean that there is less trust in the European Union. On the contrary, trust in the EU is only lower than trust in the Crown, but higher than trust in the regional government, the Spanish government, the Armed Forces, the public administration, and the courts (see Table 7).

It seems as if Spaniards' feelings about the European Union were more generalist at first, when expectations predominated but no consequences had yet been experienced. As more and more individuals have had direct or indirect contact with decisions and policies emanating from the European Union, however, opinions have become more discriminative and less generalist. Public opinion accepted the common currency since the beginning, probably because Spaniards thought it would be more secure than the peseta. The general acceptance of the European Armed Forces also solves some historical fears from the near past, when the Spanish Armed Forces were more involved in internal than external security, and is coherent with the general acceptance of their new role in humanitarian international missions outside Spain. Spaniards are more hesitant about transferring to European institutions the power to establish taxes, however, knowing that most European

countries have higher taxes than Spain, and therefore fearing that empowering Brussels with tax policies might result in higher personal costs. The more conservative orientation of Spaniards toward decisions that might be taken by the European Union is reflected on the three surveys conducted since 2000, where about two out of every three respondents agree that 'EU decisions should be implemented in Spain only if the Spanish government voted in favour of them', and where more than 40 per cent of respondents prefer the European Parliament and only 20 per cent prefer the Council of Ministers to make the most important decisions.

TABLE 8
WHO SHOULD MAKE MOST DECISIONS AFFECTING THE CITIZENS

Total	IV-00 (1,210) %	IV-01 (1,209) %	III-02 (1,220) %
The Autonomous Community	44	46	48
The Spanish State	46	46	44
The European Union	5	5	5
DK/NA	3	4	4

Source: ASEP Data Archive.

TABLE 9
ATTITUDES ON ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM

	I-91	I-92	I-93	I-94	I-95	IV-96	II-97	IV-98	IV-99	IV-00	IV-01	III-02
Law should protect Spanish products against competition of products from other EU countries	166	173	176	179	182	179	180	178	176	182	176	172
Law should protect Spanish products against competition of products from other non-EU countries	174	181	183	185	189	188	186	182	184	186	182	185

Note: * The index has been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents that agree and the proportion that disagree, adding 100 to make the index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1991 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

Given the localism to which reference has been made before, it is no surprise to find out that most Spaniards continue to prefer that most decisions that may affect them as citizens be made either by the national or the regional government, and only a very small minority would rather have the European Union do it (see Table 8).

There seem to be no complaints about the EU having too much power, however, since in the three surveys since 2000 about half of the respondents (58 per cent in 2002) answer that the EU has just the amount of power it should have, whereas similar proportions of less than 20 per cent each think that it has too much or too little power. Again, Spaniards seem to be very pro-European Union when they are talking in very general terms, but they become much more cautious and discriminative when they get down to specific issues.

This is precisely the case with respect to protectionism. Spaniards are very much in favour of protecting Spanish products against the competition of foreign non-European products, but also against the competition of European products. More than three-quarters of Spaniards show, beyond any doubt, protectionist attitudes toward Spanish products (see Table 9).


Similar protectionist attitudes are observed with respect to hiring somebody for a job. There is a clear difference, however, between

TABLE 10
ATTITUDES TOWARDS HIRING SPANIARDS OR OTHER
BETTER-QUALIFIED EUROPEANS

TOTAL	I-92 (1,200) %	I-93 (1,200) %	I-94 (1,200) %	I-95 (1,200) %	IV-96 (1,200) %	II-97 (1,213) %	IV-98 (1,204) %	IV-99 (1,214) %	IV-00 (1,210) %	IV-01 (1,209) %	III-02 (1,220) %
Better-qualified European Spaniard	54	54	49	37	39	33	26	26	31	28	35
It makes no difference	36	31	40	46	45	49	55	54	54	49	49
DK/NA	7	9	8	14	12	14	15	16	12	18	14
	3	6	3	1	4	5	4	5	4	4	3

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1992 to 1996 were collected for CIRES, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid and BBK Foundations.)

FIGURE 1
ATTITUDES TOWARDS HIRING SPANIARDS OR OTHER
BETTER-QUALIFIED EUROPEANS



Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1992 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid and BBK Foundations.)

individuals and products. Between 1992 and 1994, when respondents were asked to choose between hiring a Spaniard or a foreigner with higher qualifications, a majority answered they would hire the foreigner with higher qualifications, but since 1995 the choice has increasingly been in favour of the Spaniard (see Table 10 and Figure 1).

It seems that the high rates of unemployment experienced in Spain during the same period of 1992–95 probably had a lessening effect on attitudes toward giving preference to European over Spanish workers,

so that, in spite of the fact that unemployment has decreased steadily since 1996, Spaniards have continued to favour their fellow countrymen. The proportion saying that 'it makes no difference', however, has been increasing during the last year, and in 2002 the proportion favouring the Spanish worker is the same as the joint proportion who would rather give the job to the European or who think that 'it makes no difference'. For the time being, however, the fact remains that Spaniards seem not to accept the real consequences (and not the abstract and hypothetical consequences) of the European Union agreement on 'the free movement of products, services and individuals' statement with which a great majority of them would agree.

Thus, when comparing desired and expected goals for the European Union, only one seems to be very desirable and very likely to happen in the eyes of Spaniards: 'the elimination of all barriers to the free circulation of workers throughout the countries of the EU.' The contradiction examined earlier between the expressed importance of this goal and attitudes toward hiring a Spaniard or a better-qualified foreign worker does not need any further comment. Again, the contrast between the general and the particular appears. The high importance attached to 'achieving peace in Europe' (a clear reference to the Balkan conflict), 'reducing economic differences among EU countries', and 'establishing the United States of Europe' is not at all matched by the likelihood that these goals may become realities. Only the importance attached to 'adopting a single currency in the EU' has been matched by a growing likelihood that it would happen, as the date of its adoption became closer and closer (see Table 11).

As a summary measure of Spaniards' most recent attitudes toward the European Union, reference must be made to ASEP's national survey of July 2001, in which three questions were asked about how respondents would vote in three different hypothetical referenda if they were really taken. Results were that 80 per cent of respondents would vote in favour of Spain's permanence in the European Union, two-thirds would vote in favour of Spain's adopting the euro as the common and single currency, and 55 per cent would vote in favour of the enlargement of membership in the EU from the present 15 to the expected 27 member countries – only 17 per cent would vote against it.

The enlargement of the European Union, the regulation of immigration, and the establishment of an European defence system

TABLE 11
INDEX OF IMPORTANCE* ATTACHED TO SEVERAL EUROPEAN GOALS,
AND INDEX OF PROBABILITY* THAT GOALS WILL BE REACHED

	Index of Importance attached to each goal							
	I-95	IV-96	II-97	IV-98	IV-99	IV-00	IV-01	III-02
Eliminate all barriers to the free circulation of workers among EU countries	163	168	169	166	172	168	173	173
Reduce economic differences among EU countries	186	188	179	172	181	179	179	173
Establish the United States of Europe	134	138	129	116	118	124	127	127
Achieve peace in Europe	193	194	191	—	—	—	—	—
Establish one single currency in the EU	136	139	140	—	—	—	—	—
	Index of Probability that the goal will be reached							
	I-95	IV-96	II-97	IV-98	IV-99	IV-00	IV-01	III-02
Eliminate all barriers to the free circulation of workers among EU countries	125	123	139	137	137	134	136	132
Reduce economic differences among EU countries	66	67	79	74	73	80	63	78
Establish the United States of Europe	82	85	94	89	89	84	77	95
Achieve peace in Europe	90	103	114	—	—	—	—	—
Establish one single currency in the EU	106	123	146	—	—	—	—	—

Note: * The indexes have been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents who consider each goal important or likely to occur, and the proportion who does not consider each goal important or likely to occur, adding 100 to make each index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1995 to 1996 were collected for CIREs, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

(including the war on terrorism), in addition to the more complex modification of the institutional frame, seem to be the four most important issues facing the European Union at this time. For Spaniards, according to a recent survey (ASEP I-02), the three most important problems (mentioned by more than 50 per cent of respondents) for which the European Union should find a solution are the elimination of ETA's (*Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* – Basque Homeland and Liberty) terrorism, international terrorism, and immigration. Approximately 25 per cent of respondents also mentioned the strengthening of the euro. Again a month later (ASEP II-02), when asked about the most needed actions for the construction of Europe, 54 per cent mentioned European aid to Spain to fight ETA terrorism, 47 per cent mentioned the establishment of the 'euro order' that would permit the arrest of criminals in any European country under a judicial order issued in any other European country, 32 per cent mentioned the establishment of a common European legal system to standardize crimes and punishments, and more than 20 per cent mentioned the establishment of a common European educational system, a common judicial system, and the elaboration of an European Constitution.

With respect to the defence system, it must be underlined that in two consecutive surveys (ASEP II and III-02), Spaniards' opinions are equally divided among those who think the European Union can act independently of the United States and those who think the EU is subordinated to them. There is a high consensus, however, that they wish the European Union could act independently of the United States. For that purpose more than half of the sample in both surveys is in favour of the EU increasing its defence budget in order to be independent from the United States, and less than 20 per cent are in favour of spending less in defence and depending then on the United States.

As regards the enlargement of the European Union, only 15 per cent of respondents (ASEP I-02) admit to being somewhat or very much against admission of new members. A few months later (ASEP IV-02), after a moderate public debate about the consequences of enlargement, 22 per cent were in favour of admitting a greater number of new members as soon as possible, whereas 20 per cent were in favour of the admission of new members, but little by little, and 33 per cent were in favour of waiting until the union of the present 15-member countries was more consolidated. In fact, when respondents were asked to mention the countries that should be admitted immediately, Poland was mentioned by 20 per cent, and Hungary, the

Czech Republic, and Romania were mentioned by more than ten per cent. Once more, the data seem to support the finding that there is a great difference between general and abstract opinions and specific or more concrete opinions.

PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES OF INTEGRATION INTO THE EU

In contrast to the finding that contradictory attitudes seem to coexist with respect to the degree that Spaniards want their government to renounce important parts of its sovereignty in favour of the European Union, there seems to be a general agreement that joining the EU has been primarily positive for Spain and for Spaniards, with virtually no shadows. Benefits seem to outweigh costs and liabilities by a great margin in Spaniards' perceptions of what have been the consequences of joining the EU, and there seems to be a general trend of increasing positive perceptions when data for the past 11 years are examined (see Table 12 and Figure 2).

It must be underlined that Spaniards have consistently perceived more positive consequences for Spain than for the Autonomous Community, and more for the Autonomous Community than for oneself. This finding is even more interesting as it reverses the findings


TABLE 12
INDEX OF PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF SPAIN'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION FOR SPAIN, FOR THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY,
AND FOR THE RESPONDENT

	I-92	I-93	I-94	I-95	IV-96	II-97	IV-98	IV-99	IV-00	IV-01	III-02
SPAIN	167	153	150	142	143	159	158	170	174	166	184
Autonomous Community	156	142	144	134	137	152	150	163	168	160	181
Respondent	140	130	135	127	123	132	145	153	163	156	176

Note: * In April 1998 the question asked for the benefit or cost of membership in the European Union. The index has been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents that perceive positive consequences and the proportion that perceive negative consequences, adding 100 to make the index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1992 to 1996 were collected for CIRES, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid, and BBK Foundations.)

FIGURE 2
INDEX OF PERCEIVED EFFECTS OF SPAIN'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION FOR SPAIN, FOR THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY
AND FOR THE RESPONDENT



Note: In April 1998 the question asked for the benefit of membership in the European Union. The Index has been constructed on the basis of the difference between the proportion of respondents that perceive positive consequences and the proportion that perceive negative consequences, adding 100 to make the index positive and varying between 0 and 200.

Source: ASEP Data Archive. (Data from 1992 to 1996 were collected for CIRES, a project sponsored by the BBV, Caja de Madrid and BBK Foundations.)

when using Cantril's scale about the comparative evaluation (past, present, and future) that individuals make of the world's, country's, and self's situation. Cantril's findings have been replicated and confirmed in numerous surveys around the world, and also in Spain at very different dates, including ASEP surveys (Cantril 1965; Díez-Nicolás and

Torregrosa 1967; Díez-Nicolás 1997). Similar findings using the Consumer Sentiment Index components (national and personal) consistently show that individuals usually evaluate their past, present, and future economic situations better than they evaluate those of the country. It is true, however, that when comparing the national and personal components of the Consumer Sentiment Index, there are periods when respondents evaluate the national economic situation better than the individual's.

This happened as well in Spain during 1996–2000, when economic recovery after a long period of economic recession (with very high unemployment and inflation rates) was perceived earlier at the national than at the personal level. Such a perception was due to the persuasive influence of mass media and opinion leaders, who apparently convinced the population about the national economic recovery, though individuals could not see the recovery of their personal and household economy. It may also be that, with respect to benefits deriving from integration into the European Union, Spaniards accept the interpretation given by mass media and opinion leaders that benefits outweigh costs for Spain as a whole, and also (but less so) for their Autonomous Community, which they know better because it is closer to them. They do not yet perceive, however, how membership in the EU has benefited them personally (though they accept it because of the external influence of mass media).

Spaniards still consider Spain's economic development below the European level, but opinions seem to acknowledge a reduction of the gap. In 1992, 74 per cent of respondents estimated that Spain was lagging with respect to Europe; that proportion has dropped to 64 per cent in 2002. The proportion that thinks Spain is at the same level of economic development as Europe has increased from 19 per cent to 32 per cent during the same period. Along the same line, when respondents were asked about the degree of social justice in Spain and in the European Union, using a 0 to 10 scale, the ratings were 6.0 for the EU and 5.5 for Spain in 1995, but were 6.0 and 5.8 in 2002. When respondents were asked to express their degree of satisfaction with respect to the level of living in Spain compared to that in the rest of Europe, the proportion that said they were satisfied or very satisfied increased from 52 per cent in 1995 to 74 per cent in 2002. The proportion that felt very or somewhat deceived declined from 40 per cent to 23 per cent during the same period.

Spaniards, therefore, tend to perceive that the gap between Spain and other European Union countries is reducing rapidly, particularly during

recent years (the comparisons reported above refer to an eight-year period). It is not only their perceptions and evaluations that have changed; however, they also perceive changes in the Europeans' perceptions and evaluations of Spain.

Thus, only 34 per cent of respondents in 1996 thought Europeans had a positive or very positive opinion about Spain's level of economic development, but that proportion increased to 58 per cent in 2002. Perceptions of negative or very negative opinions have decreased from 27 per cent to nine per cent in the same period. Very much in the same direction, 36 per cent of respondents in 1996 felt that Europeans had a positive or very positive opinion about Spaniards. That proportion increased to 60 per cent in 2002, and 22 per cent thought Europeans had a negative or very negative opinion of Spaniards in 1996, but the latter proportion was reduced to only eight per cent in 2002.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented and analyzed above seems to support the general hypothesis that Spaniards have been and still are highly in favour of integration into Europe, with virtually no 'euro-sceptics'. This almost unanimous consensus in favour of integration into Europe, even after 16 years of membership, seems to be the consequence of Spain's need to overcome its historical isolation from the rest of Europe since the nineteenth century until the end of the Franco regime in 1975.

In fact, the data support the idea that Spaniards are convinced of the great benefits and low costs that membership in the EU has produced for Spain, for their region, and for themselves. Spaniards perceive that the gap between Spain and other European Union countries has been reduced rapidly with respect to economic development and modernization, social justice, and level of living. They also perceive that the Europeans' perceptions and evaluations of Spain and Spaniards are now much better than in the past, as the data presented above demonstrate. In addition, Spaniards perceive a higher international respect for Spain now than during the Franco regime,¹⁰ and in 2002 they consider almost unanimously the changes that have taken place in Spain during the last 30 years as very positive or positive, to the point that only 19 per cent would admit feeling very or somewhat satisfied with respect to the Franco regime period, against 83 per cent who feel very or somewhat satisfied with the democratic transition period (a great

change with respect to 1995, when the same figures were 33 per cent and 73 per cent respectively). On the contrary, those dissatisfied with the Franco regime period were 51 per cent in 1995 and 63 per cent in 2002, whereas those dissatisfied with the democratic transition period have decreased from 23 per cent to nine per cent during the same nine-year period.

To summarize, Spaniards aimed to be Europeans to break with isolation. Their hopes about the benefits they would obtain from joining Europe seem to have been accomplished to a large extent, as opinion data for the past twelve years support with great consistency. Apparently, Spaniards have not yet found any arguments to complain about having joined Europe, though they certainly exhibit protectionist attitudes toward both Spain's products and workers.

NOTES

1. The most conspicuous leaders of the opposition during that period, Ruiz Giménez, Tierno Galván, Satrústegui, and many others, did not miss any opportunity, when they visited other countries or when foreign dignitaries visited Spain, to express their best arguments to achieve the full incorporation of Spain to those three international 'clubs', with the clear goal, of course, of achieving through them the full democratization of Spanish political structures. Certainly, some other opposition leaders, such as Santiago Carrillo, agreed to the desire of Spain being admitted to the Council of Europe and to the Common Market, but absolutely disagreed with respect to the possible incorporation of Spain to NATO. That is another subject that will not be followed up here, however.
2. The *Instituto de la Opinión Pública* (Public Opinion Institute) was founded in 1963 as a governmental department within the Ministry of Information and Tourism, and was part of the reforms toward some liberalization of information during that decade (Díez-Nicolás 1976). The results of all its surveys were published in *Revista Española de la Opinión Pública* [Spanish Journal of Public Opinion], Madrid, and were widely used by Spanish social scientists at that time, though questions that touched very closely the political regime were not included.
3. The *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (Center for Sociological Research – CIS) substituted the IOP in 1977, after the first democratic elections, as a department of the Ministry of the Presidency, and played an important role in providing information for many of the decisions made by the Government during the political transition to democracy. Its results are published in the *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* [Spanish Journal of Sociological Research], Madrid.
4. All data cited here from IOP and CIS may be consulted in CIS Data Archive or in the two mentioned journals, REOP and REIS.
5. ASEP (*Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos* – Political, Economic and Sociological Analysis) is a private survey research institute that has conducted a national sample survey of 1,200 every month since 1986. Its Data Archive, accessible by request, includes monthly, quarterly, or annual time series for more than 160 months, more than 45 quarters, and about 16 years.

6. It must be emphasized that, even when Latin Americans are referred to as immigrants into Spain, Spaniards evaluate them better than any other group of migrants, and they perceive them as having more facilities for integration into Spanish society and as being more integrated than any other group of immigrants (Díez-Nicolás and Ramírez-Lafita 2001a), and they themselves feel better integrated into Spanish society than any other group of immigrants (Díez-Nicolás and Ramírez-Lafita 2001b).
7. All references to the 12 surveys conducted by ASEP between 1991 and 2002 on Spaniards' Supranational Identity will be referred to in the text only by the year they were conducted. When data belong to another ASEP survey, the text will make reference to the month it was conducted. Juan Díez-Medrano contributed extensively to the elaboration of the questionnaire that, for the most part, has been replicated for 12 years.
8. PP is the centre-right *Partido Popular* (Popular Party); PSOE stands for the left-left *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spanish Socialist Worker Party); and the IU stands for the leftist *Izquierda Unida* (United Left). These are the three most important national parties, and their share of the total vote in the last general elections of 2000 was, respectively, 44.5 per cent, 34.1 per cent, and 4.2 per cent.
9. For a comprehensive analysis of explanatory models of Spaniards' attitudes toward the European Union and the degree of identification of Spaniards with Europe, see Díez-Medrano (1995: 73–89).
10. In 1995, 30 per cent of respondents believed that international respect for Spain during the Franco regime was high or moderate, whereas 63 per cent believed the same about international respect for Spain at that date. These proportions changed to 15 per cent and 83 per cent respectively in 2002, showing a great increase in the perception of the gap between the two types of regimes in only seven years.

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