

Values and Perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern Publics

Edited by
Mansoor Moaddel



Values and Perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern Publics

Edited by
Mansoor Moaddel

palgrave
macmillan

C O N T E N T S

<i>List of Figures</i>	ix
<i>List of Tables</i>	xi
<i>Preface</i>	xiv
<i>List of Contributors</i>	xvi
1 Introduction: Theoretical and Methodological Issues in the Study of Values <i>Mansoor Moaddel</i>	1
 Part 1 Islam in a Global Perspective 	
2 The Worldviews of Islamic Publics in Global Perspective <i>Ronald F. Inglehart</i>	25
3 Value Systems of Elites and Publics in the Mediterranean: Convergence or Divergence <i>Juan Díez-Nicolás</i>	47
4 Muslim Immigrants in Western Europe: Persisting Value Differences or Value Adaptation? <i>Thorleif Pettersson</i>	71
 Part 2 Political and Economic Consequences of Islam versus Rentier Economy 	
5 Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from the World Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria <i>Mark Tessler</i>	105

- 6 The Egalitarian Face of Islamic Orthodoxy: Support for Islamic Law and Economic Justice in Seven Muslim-Majority Nations 126
Nancy J. Davis and Robert V. Robinson
- 7 The Rentier State: Does Rentierism Hinder Democracy? The Rentier Mentality Hypothesis Tested in Seven Middle Eastern Countries 160
Bi Puranen and Olof Widenfalk

Part 3 Determinants of Self-Rated Health and Attitudes toward Religion, Gender and Democracy

- 8 Social Structure versus Perception: A Cross-National Comparison of Self-Rated Health in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and the United States 181
Kristine J. Ajrouch and Mansoor Moaddel
- 9 The Saudi Public Speaks: Religion, Gender, and Politics 209
Mansoor Moaddel

Part 4 Events and Changes in Values and Perceptions

- 10 Events and Value Change: The Impact of September 11, 2001 on the Worldviews of Egyptians and Moroccans 249
Mansoor Moaddel and Abdul-Hamid Abdul-Latif
- 11 Xenophobia and In-Group Solidarity in Iraq: A Natural Experiment on the Impact of Insecurity 298
Ronald Inglehart, Mansoor Moaddel, and Mark Tessler

Part 5 Methodology

- 12 Probability Sampling and the Scientific Survey Method for Population Studies: Application to Survey Research in Islamic Countries 323
Steven G. Heeringa

CHAPTER 3

Value Systems of Elites and Publics in the Mediterranean: Convergence or Divergence

JUAN DÍEZ-NICOLÁS

Elites and Publics

The study of elites and publics has always received great attention in the social sciences, since the early times (Lasswell 1936; Mannheim 1935; Mosca 1939/1896; Ortega y Gasset 1929; Pareto 1902–03). In general, the concept of elites has referred to social minorities and ruling minorities, mainly in the fields of politics, the military, the economy, business, and culture. In earlier times scholars did not differentiate so much among different types of elites, and referred to them as minorities in power, simply because there was a great overlap among the elites in different fields. The tendency to refer to elites as a compound mixture of minorities in different sectors of society persisted however for a long time, and were generally referred to as the “ruling class,” “the power elite” (Mills 1956) or the like (Bottomore 1964; Lasswell 1952), though other authors preferred to discriminate among different types of elites, for example, “strategic elites” (Keller 1963), to designate minorities who had authority or power in different sectors of society (politics, religion, business, fashion, etc.). More recently there has been a proliferation of country studies of elites (some examples are Collier 1999; Eldersveld 1995; Lerner et al. 2004; Perthes 2004; Verba et al. 1987; Werbner 2004; Yoder 1999), whose findings are more difficult to generalize, as well as other more general works (Carlton 1996; Etzioni-Halevy 1997; Marger 1981;

Walden 2000). Most studies of elites, including those cited, refer to elites as very small social minorities who occupy power positions either in society at large or within some part of it. But, generally, there is little comparison with publics or masses, which usually appear in the background as a necessary complement to elites, since there would be no minorities without majorities. An important exception would be Kornhauser's fourfold classification of societies on the basis of accessibility of elites and availability of nonelites (Kornhauser 1959).

The approach that has been adopted in this research shares with most of the works in this area the assumption that elites influence publics though some recent research findings establish limitations of that influence (Druckman and Nelson 2003; Paul and Brown 2001), but does differ from them in several respects. First, the concept of elites is defined in a less rigid and more flexible manner to avoid the rigid elites-publics dichotomy and, instead, treat these two concepts as the poles of a continuum. In this respect, the analysis follows a similar but revised methodology that Galtung established four decades ago to construct a "social position" index as a tool to test his "center-periphery" theory (Galtung 1964, 1976). Second, rather than focusing on the values of elites, the values of elites and publics are always compared within and between societies (developed versus less developed, Mediterranean-European versus Mediterranean-Islamic).

Galtung's main assumption was that some social positions receive more rewards (economic, prestige, power) than others. He then selected eight sociodemographic characteristics that are rewarded differently by societies to construct the social position index, which produced a scale of nine categories.¹ Lower ratings received the name of "social periphery," while higher ratings on the scale received the name of "social center," and the extremes of the scale received the names of "extreme periphery" and "decision-making nucleus" respectively. As may be noticed, the conceptualization of "elites" and "publics" based on the social position index allows for greater flexibility, since each researcher may define elites-publics (center-periphery) differently (defining one or more positions in the scale as center or periphery), in order to meet specific research requirements. Social center (as the sum of the more socially rewarded positions) and social periphery (as the sum of the less socially rewarded positions) differ from each other in many respects. Individuals belong to the social center or the social periphery not because of their personal traits, but because of the different status they hold, which corresponds to social roles they perform in society.

According to Galtung's center-periphery theory, the center has more knowledge, particularly about policies, while the periphery shows little

knowledge, particularly in regard to policies. As a consequence, the center has more opinions, while the periphery has fewer or no opinions. Therefore, as the center has more knowledge and opinions and has more access to mass media, communication flows generally from the center to the periphery (among other things because the center has more things to communicate). It also follows that the center will demand and show more social participation, especially through secondary (associations) and tertiary channels (mass media), while the periphery will demand and exhibit less social participation, manifested through primary channels (interpersonal communication). Therefore, new ideas and social values originate mainly in the center and from it they are disseminated to the periphery (and even if new values or ideas originate in the periphery, they will have to be adopted by some group in the center if they are to be disseminated to the rest of society). At this point it may be necessary to clarify that the center is by definition ideologically heterogeneous (no ideological characteristics are used to define center or periphery), so that new ideas in the periphery may always find some group in the center willing to accept them and disseminate them. Center and periphery differ in many other respects, but especially on their orientation to social change: the center will favor gradual change, reforms, while the periphery will be more absolutist, in favor of changing everything (radical or revolutionary change) or of no change at all (defense of the status quo). Most of the hypotheses of this theory have been verified repeatedly (Díez-Nicolás 1966, 1968, 1996; Halle 1966; van der Veer 1976), and they have also contributed to specify some of the main hypotheses of Inglehart's theory of cultural change (Díez-Nicolás 1999, 2000, 2004a), especially with respect to the emergence of the new values in favor of protecting the environment.

The main hypothesis that is tested here is another example of how Galtung's theory of the emergence and diffusion of new values can complement Inglehart's theory of cultural change. Thus, according to Inglehart's well-known hypotheses, postmaterialist, or self-expression values are more frequently found, at the macro level, in more developed societies, and at the micro level, in the upper strata of each society. Consequently, elites (the social center) in developed and less developed societies should be expected to share more similar values amongst themselves than with their respective publics (the social periphery), so that it should be possible to observe a convergence of values between elites at the same time that a divergence of values occurs between elites and their respective publics. The convergence of values between elites would be a consequence of their greater access to communication facilities (telephone,

internet, travelling, interpersonal communication through professional meetings) and, as a result, to the greater possibilities of interaction between them. A second hypothesis that will be tested is that publics in developed and less developed societies should show the largest divergence in values, due to infrequent interaction between them.

Does Globalization Lead to Convergence?

Globalization is not a new process. It has been at work since the beginning of history, as human societies have grown from the early self-sufficient and independent communities to ever expanding and interdependent human communities in terms of population, elaborate technology, complex social organization, and with access to an expanding environment due to technological developments in the means of communication and transportations (Díez-Nicolás 1999; Duncan 1964; Hawley 1986). Fukuyama has observed that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there seems to be only one model of economic organization, the free market economy, and one model of political organization, the parliamentary democracy (Fukuyama 1991), and that all societies claim to have achieved or to be in the process of achieving both. The explicit assumption of this argument is that there is a universal convergence toward these two organizational systems, and that their universal acceptance will be more or less permanent (an assumption that leads to his conclusion about the end of history).² There is, however, an implicit assumption in Fukuyama: that if there is a more or less universal convergence toward the same models of economic and political organization, there should also be a similar process of convergence in values and beliefs systems. This assumption is tenable, because increasing economic interdependence worldwide (and consequently increasing interaction worldwide) leads to isomorphism of organizational arrangements (as it is observed regarding political and economic institutions as well as other institutional arrangements). And due to developments in the means of communication and transportation (satellites, internet, and movies), one should expect cultural convergence and isomorphism.

The explicit assumption about the institutional convergence in the economic and political realms seems to be supported by facts, and the implicit assumption regarding a certain convergence in values and beliefs systems has been supported by the results of extensive analysis of values surveys that were carried out by Inglehart and others. Just as societies still differ in the degree to which they have achieved a free market economy

and parliamentary democracy, societies still differ, probably even more, in the degree to which they have achieved a certain cultural model characterized by a new value system. Inglehart has shown how most societies seem to be changing from survival values to self-expression values, from traditional values to rational-secular values, and how the values systems that accompanied the process of change from traditional to industrial society are again changing in the transition from industrial to postindustrial society (Inglehart et al. 2004). Welzel has also explained how these two processes are linked to produce a more encompassing process of human development characterized by a continuous drive toward values of emancipation that constitute the basis of democratic systems (Welzel 2003; Welzel et al. 2003). According to this theory, the new values are more widespread among the more developed societies, and within each society, among people with the higher socioeconomic status.

The methodological strategy of this chapter is twofold. First, comparisons at the macro level (using countries as units of analysis) must be made with great care. This is because survey data are not in some cases representative of the total population, but frequently neglect or underrepresent the lower strata (the social periphery). Second, comparisons at the micro level will likely show that there are different rhythms of change for different groups within each society. They also should show that the different rhythms of change cause some unexpected (and maybe undesired) consequences, the most important of them being that elites in less developed countries are approaching the value systems of elites in the more developed societies, while detaching themselves at the same time from the values of their respective social peripheries. This hypothesis would not contradict the previous hypothesis that the higher social strata acquire the new values earlier than the lower strata, just as more developed countries acquire them earlier than less developed countries, but it specifies that the different rhythms of change produce a convergence of elites in very different societies on a shared system of values, but at the same time a growing divergence between elites and publics in each society. It seems relevant to test this hypothesis on the basis of a massive amount of data that are provided by the EVS and the WVS.

Before analyzing these hypotheses about the Mediterranean region, it was thought relevant to test these hypotheses at a more general level by comparing countries with different degrees of development in the world as a whole. Assuming that findings should be similar at the world and the Mediterranean levels, the value of the findings would be enhanced. In fact, the comparison between developed European-Christian societies and less-developed Islamic societies in the Mediterranean can be considered

a special case of the more general comparison between developed and less developed countries.

Measuring the Concepts of Elites and Development

To measure development, countries have been grouped according to cultural areas that are somewhat similar to Huntington's (Huntington 1996) classification of civilizations.³ For each country four measures of development were obtained: economic, political, social, and cultural. GNP per capita is used to measure economic development. Political development is measured by Freedom House ratings of democracy (FHR). Social development is measured by the Human Development index (HDI). To measure cultural development, the two dimensions developed by Inglehart (1990, 1997), the survival-self expression dimension—equivalent to the former materialist-postmaterialist dimension (POSTMAT) in previous publications (Díez-Nicolás 2000; Inglehart 1977)—and the traditional-secular/rational dimension (TRADRAT) were used.

Taking countries as the units of analysis, the correlation coefficients among the five measures for 81 countries were all above .45 and statistically significant at the .01 level, with the only exception of the relationship between the two cultural values dimensions, as expected, since they are intended to measure two distinctive and independent dimensions of values.⁴

Furthermore, countries were grouped into the 13 world regions mentioned above, and averages in the same 5 variables have been calculated for each region, with a similar rank-order in each dimension. It may be noted that four regions (Anglo-Saxon, West European Catholic, West European Protestant, and Japan) rank higher than the rest in all five dimensions of development, with the only exception of the traditional-secular/rational dimension, in which Israel, East European Christian, and European Orthodox countries show greater secularization than Anglo-Saxon and West European Catholic countries. This finding has been confirmed in all waves of the values studies, and they suggest that traditional values based on religion have continued to play a more important role in some Western countries than they have played in countries that were under communist rule. One should underline the difference in the trajectory of development between the Anglo-Saxon and West European Protestant countries, probably due to the different paths taken by the Reformation in different parts of Europe. Thus, while

Lutherans (who subordinated religion to political power) remained in most of Central and Northern Europe, Calvinists (who subordinated political power to religion) became a minority established mainly in the Netherlands and Switzerland, which, after being prosecuted, escaped mainly to Great Britain (and from there to the New World as Pilgrims) and to South Africa. It should also be noted that Israel is a kind of frontier between the four more developed world regions and the less developed regions (figure 3.1).

In any case, the traditional-secular/rational dimension seems to be the only one that is less related to the other dimensions of development. The correlation coefficients among the five indicators of development are significant at the .01 level, except for the relationship between the two values dimensions. These significant correlation coefficients show that development in one dimension is associated with development in other dimensions, confirming that the different dimensions are all manifestations of the nonmaterial culture and, as such, instrumental social responses that human populations develop when interacting with their environment (Díez-Nicolás 2003). The strong relationships between the five dimensions facilitates classifying world regions as developed or less developed, precisely because it makes it unnecessary to specify what kind of development is being measured.




Figure 3.1 Survival/Self-expression values by GNP per capita

If the world regions are plotted on any two dimensions, they show a regular pattern of greater development (economic, political, social, or cultural) in the same areas, as well as a great gap between the more developed and the less developed. The Anglo-Saxon countries, the West European (Catholic and Protestant) countries, and Japan are classified as developed areas. The countries included in the other regions have been divided into two groups: (1) the East European Christian (EEC) and the European Orthodox (EO) countries, and (2) the remaining countries, considering the latter as less developed in general (i.e., taking all five dimensions into account). The EEC and EO countries, which include most of the former communist countries, are very low on the postmaterialist dimension, mainly due to their experience as economies based on state-socialism, though they rate very high on the traditional-secular/rational dimension (Inglehart 1990, 1997).

To measure elites, a revised version of the social position index developed by Galtung (Díez-Nicolás 1999, 2004a; Galtung 1964, 1976) has been constructed for this analysis. Thus, instead of dichotomizing the eight variables that Galtung used to construct the social position index, an effort has been made to measure them through several categories. In fact, only sex and age have been dichotomized, while four other indicators of social position have been measured on three-point scales (education, employment status, income, and size of habitat), and occupational prestige has been measured on a four-point scale. This modified version of the social position index varies between 0 and 13, and includes seven variables, while Galtung's index varied between 0 and 8, and included eight variables. The main difference between the two indices, apart from the number of categories in the scale, is that the variables are not given the same weight. Sex and age are given less weight, while occupation is given more weight, on the assumption that occupation is the main source of all kind of social rewards in present societies, not just economic rewards.⁵ This explains why the social position index is more strongly correlated with employment status ($r = .70$) and profession ($r = .68$), and less strongly related (but still significantly) with sex, age, and size of place of residence ($r > .30$).

The fact that many countries lacked information on one or more of the variables used to construct the social position index caused the loss of a few thousand respondents (17 percent of the original 118,520 respondents), as well as the loss of ten countries.⁶ The analysis was then based on the information for 71 countries, with a total N of 98,702 individuals. The distribution of these individuals is very close to a normal distribution, though a little skewed toward the lower end of the scale. For the

purpose of this analysis, the world regions are divided into three categories, as explained, and the operationalization of the concept of elites is based on the distribution by social position, assuming that individuals closer to point 13 on the scale (high social position) are probably members of the elite in their society (defining elites in a very broad manner), while individuals closer to point 0 in the scale are most likely to be publics (nonelites) in their societies.

As table 3.1 illustrates, there seems to be no significant difference on the shape of the distribution on the social position index among the three groups of countries.⁷ While it would seem normal that population distribution by sex and age, and even by size of habitat, might not be very different among countries, it is more difficult to accept that developed and less developed countries may have similar distributions of their adult populations with respect to education, income, employment, and occupation. This finding seems to indicate that the samples are not always representative of each country's population. A more detailed examination of the data shows that among the less developed countries one finds samples that are not proportionally representative of their populations; on the contrary, they seem to overrepresent some social sectors (the more educated, the higher incomes, the urban populations).

Table 3.1 Distribution of respondents by social position and degree of development, by world regions

Social position	More developed (AS+WEC+WEP)		Developing (EEC+EO)		Less developed (LA+SC+Ind+ SSA+Ph)	
	N=	%	N=	%	N=	%
Low	71	.3	65	.3	241	.6
1	545	2.1	614	2.9	1,510	3.7
2	1,599	6.1	1,474	6.6	2,677	6.7
3	2,614	10.1	2,311	10.0	3,834	9.5
4	3,067	11.6	2,702	11.5	4,767	11.6
5	3,245	12.0	2,851	12.2	5,256	12.8
6	3,443	12.7	2,863	12.2	5,158	12.5
7	3,458	12.7	2,859	12.1	4,792	11.5
8	2,990	10.9	2,627	11.2	3,863	9.3
9	2,404	8.8	2,138	9.0	3,215	7.8
10	1,779	6.6	1,459	6.2	2,419	6.0
11	1,100	4.0	888	3.7	1,643	4.3
12	480	1.8	402	1.7	841	2.4
High	134	.5	82	.4	191	.6
Total	26,929	100.2	23,335	100.0	40,407	99.3

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al, 2004.

Thus, about 40 percent of respondents, both in more developed and less developed countries, have a low education, and about 20 percent in each group of countries have a high education, a finding that is a bit surprising. Similarly, 28 percent and 25 percent of respondents in less developed and more developed countries are on the upper layer of income in their countries, and about 10 percent in each group has high prestige occupations. Certainly this does not completely preclude a comparative analysis of countries, but it does impose very severe limitations on the comparison of country averages, or, for this purpose, of world regions' averages, because it is quite evident that in the case of developed countries samples seem to be proportionally representative of their populations, while samples in less developed countries seem to represent not their total populations, but their middle and upper socioeconomic strata.⁸ It seems legitimate, however, to compare similar social position groups in more and less developed countries, even when their proportional representation does not correspond to their real weight in their country, though the underrepresentation of the lower social strata of less developed societies may introduce important distortions on the results.

Is There a Convergence of Values between Elites in Countries with Different Degrees of Development?

To test the main hypothesis of this research, the average measure of postmaterialist values based on Inglehart's four items scale⁹ has been calculated for elites and nonelites in developed and less developed world regions (table 3.2).

Postmaterialist values vary directly with social position. The average index of postmaterialist values varies positively with social position, and the relationship holds in all three groups of countries. This finding mostly confirms the main hypothesis established by Inglehart in his early writings on cultural change, that is, that postmaterialist values are first adopted by the most developed societies and, within each society, by those in higher socioeconomic strata. However, though postmaterialist values are higher in developed countries, there is no significant difference when developing and less developed countries are compared. The data also confirms Galtung's theory that new values are adopted earlier and in greater proportion by the "social center" than by the "social periphery," both at the country and the individual levels.

According to the main hypothesis established for this research, developments in communication and transportation that go along with

Table 3.2 Distribution of respondents by social position and postmaterialism, by world regions

Social position	More developed		Developing		Less developed	
	N =	Postmaterialism	N =	Postmaterialism	N =	Postmaterialism
Low	71	1.73	65	1.48	241	1.55
1	545	1.77	614	1.47	1,510	1.55
2	1,599	1.80	1,474	1.53	2,677	1.60
3	2,614	1.87	2,311	1.56	3,834	1.68
4	3,067	1.94	2,702	1.60	4,767	1.71
5	3,245	1.98	2,851	1.64	5,256	1.71
6	3,443	2.03	2,863	1.67	5,158	1.72
7	3,458	2.05	2,859	1.70	4,792	1.74
8	2,990	2.08	2,627	1.73	3,863	1.76
9	2,404	2.13	2,138	1.73	3,215	1.81
10	1,779	2.19	1,459	1.81	2,419	1.82
11	1,100	2.24	888	1.84	1,643	1.87
12	480	2.29	402	1.89	841	1.86
High	134	2.42	82	1.95	191	1.95

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al. 2004.

globalization facilitate elites in less developed countries to acquire the values and lifestyles of elites in developed countries. But, in contrast with this process of convergence among elites, one finds a growing divergence of values between elites and their respective nonelites or publics. Data seems to confirm these two contrasting processes. Thus, if elites and nonelites are strictly defined as positions 13 and 0 in the social position index, the ratio of postmaterialism of elites in developed countries to elites in less developed countries is smaller (1.24) than the ratios between elites and publics in developed countries (1.40) and between elites and publics in less developed countries (1.26), though larger than the ratio between publics in developed and less developed countries (1.12). The hypothesis that elites' values in more and less developed countries, as measured by the postmaterialist index, are more similar to each other than to their respective publics is supported by the data, though the hypothesis that the greatest difference would be found between publics in more and less developed countries is not supported by the data. This finding is probably due to the fact that samples in less developed countries have underrepresented their lower social position strata (table 3.3).

Similar results are found if social position is grouped into four groups: 0–3 (social periphery), 4–6, 7–9, and 10–13 (social center), and countries are grouped into three categories according to their degree of development. Again, it appears that postmaterialism is greater among the elites and smaller among the publics in the three groups of countries. Elites in

Table 3.3 Postmaterialism by social position, by world regions

<i>Social position</i>	<i>More developed</i>	<i>Developing</i>	<i>Less developed</i>
Elites (9–13)	2.23	1.83	1.85
2 (7–9)	2.08	1.72	1.77
1 (4–6)	1.99	1.64	1.71
Publics (0–3)	1.83	1.54	1.63

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al. 2004.

developed countries are the most oriented toward postmaterialism, while publics in less developed countries are the least postmaterialist, as expected. And when ratios are calculated, the ratio between the postmaterialist indexes of elites in developed and in less developed countries is slightly lower than the ratio between elites and publics in developed countries, but higher than the same ratio in less developed countries. This finding would seem to indicate that convergence between elites and publics in less developed countries is higher than between elites and publics in developed countries, a result that can legitimately be questioned when taking into account the more than likely assumption that the real lower social strata in less developed countries have been not only underestimated but probably neglected altogether. Consequently, the smallest ratio is found when comparing publics in developed and in less developed countries, something that very likely results from the fact that the lower strata of less developed countries have not been included in the samples of many less developed countries, and that what appears to be lower social positions are in fact middle social positions.

Elites and Publics in the Mediterranean

Comparing values of elites and publics in developed and less developed regions may hide very important internal differences. Most of the literature analyzing values has focused on comparing “the West” with Islam, since religion, and especially Muslim religion seems to make a significant difference on values, especially values related to gender inequality and the role of women in society, as well as on the influence of religion on politics (Inglehart 2003a, 2003b; Norris and Inglehart 2004). But, apart from the fact that neither Islam nor “the West” is a homogeneous category, the lack of homogeneity is especially acute regarding the role of religion and traditional social values in general (Díez-Nicolás 2003). In fact, while differences between Catholic and Protestant European countries seem to

have decreased greatly over the past century, differences between these two groups of countries and Anglo-Saxon countries continue to exist regarding religious values, and some analysts would even argue that they have increased in recent decades (though with the exception of the United Kingdom, which in this respect is more similar to continental Europe than to other Anglo-Saxon countries).

The Mediterranean basin, on the other hand, offers the possibility to compare a relatively large number of developed countries that also seem to be relatively homogeneous in their cultural values (especially regarding religion) with a large number of less developed countries that share the common characteristic of being also relatively homogeneous in their Islamic beliefs (table 3.4).

Thus, eight European countries and eight Islamic countries that are either Mediterranean or close to the Mediterranean have been selected for this analysis.¹⁰ Though Germany, Austria, and Switzerland cannot be considered Mediterranean from a geographical point of view, they have been selected because they are culturally closer to that region than would other Northern or Eastern European countries, with a mixture of Protestant and Catholic majorities and a high degree of economic development and democratic political stability. They also provide a balance to the number of countries on the Islamic side of the comparison.

Table 3.4 Distribution of Mediterranean European or Islamic respondents by social position

<i>Social Position</i>	<i>European-Christians</i>		<i>Islamic</i>	
	<i>N =</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>N =</i>	<i>%</i>
Low	54	.4	71	.5
1	365	2.9	537	3.9
2	909	7.1	1,131	8.3
3	1,426	11.1	1,511	11.0
4	1,660	13.0	1,583	11.6
5	1,628	12.7	1,730	12.6
6	1,684	13.2	1,768	13.0
7	1,661	13.0	1,607	11.7
8	1,343	10.5	1,326	9.7
9	944	7.4	1,006	7.3
10	653	5.1	722	5.3
11	294	2.3	437	3.2
12	139	1.1	218	1.6
High	31	.2	45	.3
Total	12,791	100.0	13,692	100.0

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al. 2004.

The subsample drawn from the previous larger sample of 71 countries and 98,702 individuals has been reduced to 16 countries and 26,501 individuals. Like in the larger sample, a surprising finding is that the distributions by social position in the eight European-Christian-developed countries and the eight Islamic-less developed countries do not differ significantly.¹¹ Thus, the social periphery (social position 0–3) represents 22 percent and 24 percent in European-Christian and in Islamic countries respectively, while the social center (social position 9–13) represents 16 percent and 18 percent respectively, suggesting that the lower social strata in Islamic countries are very underrepresented, while the higher social strata are overrepresented in their samples. This is an important problem for description and for using countries as units of analysis, but not for causal-explanatory analysis and for comparing segments of societies in European-Christian and in Islamic countries, though it may affect comparativeness by ignoring the very low strata in society, if they are not only underrepresented but not represented at all. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of the true lower socioeconomic strata in Islamic countries would increase the weight of the social periphery in absolute and relative terms, and consequently their values would gain greater weight when considering the average measures for each group (table 3.5).

As expected, postmaterialism is positively related to social position in both groups of Mediterranean countries (it is higher when the social

Table 3.5 Postmaterialism of Mediterranean European-Christian or Islamic respondents, by social position

Social Position	European-Christians		Islamic	
	N =	Postmaterialism	N =	Postmaterialism
Low	54	1.70	71	1.61
1	365	1.72	537	1.57
2	909	1.72	1,131	1.60
3	1,426	1.81	1,511	1.68
4	1,660	1.90	1,583	1.68
5	1,628	1.94	1,730	1.69
6	1,684	2.01	1,768	1.69
7	1,661	2.01	1,607	1.73
8	1,343	2.07	1,326	1.72
9	944	2.14	1,006	1.79
10	653	2.15	722	1.82
11	294	2.20	437	1.89
12	139	2.27	218	1.89
High	31	2.30	45	1.89

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al. 2004.

position is higher, with only minor exceptions in Islamic countries), and European-Christians of any social position are more postmaterialist than their Islamic counterparts. If one compares the values of postmaterialism indices among the four more extreme positions (0 and 13 in European-Christian and Islamic societies), they are, as expected, highest among the central nucleus of European-Christian societies and lowest in the extreme periphery of Islamic societies, with central nucleus of Islamic societies showing more postmaterialist attitudes than the extreme periphery of European-Christian societies. Differences in postmaterialist attitudes of the European-Christian central nucleus and its Islamic counterpart (as measured by the ratio between the two indexes) are smaller than between those of the central nucleus and the extreme periphery in European-Christian countries. But, once more, the other two differences are not the ones that would be expected, most likely because the social periphery in Islamic countries is underestimated or even not measured, so that postmaterialism is overestimated. A comparison of elites and publics in the two groups of countries, using different groupings of elites and publics, also confirms that the difference between European-Christian and Islamic elites is smaller than the difference between each elite and its corresponding public (though, again, the exception is the Islamic social periphery, probably due to the fact that the real social periphery in these countries was not represented in their samples).

It is a common finding that changes in different types of values follow different rhythms of change, especially when comparing political and religious values (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Therefore, the same comparative analysis shown has been replicated for more specific values: political values, moral-ethical values, attitudes toward migrants, religious values, and social exclusion values. Elites have been defined as social positions 9–13, publics as social positions 0–3, and social positions 4–8 have been excluded to make the contrasting differences more evident (table 3.6).

Convergence in political values between elites in Mediterranean European and Islamic countries is even more marked than when developed and less developed countries are compared because there is more internal homogeneity within these two groups of countries. Islamic elites give more importance to politics than European elites (probably because the latter have had democratic institutions for a long time now, while in Islamic countries there is a shorter, if at all, democratic tradition), and they are equally supporters of having a democratic political system. The finding that political democratic values are not incompatible with Islamic culture is not a novelty (Moaddel 2002; Tessler 2002).

Table 3.6 Indicators of political values of elites and publics in European-Christian and Islamic Mediterranean countries

	Importance of politics ^a	Having a Democratic political system ^b	Political action ^c	Discuss politics ^d	Interested in politics ^e
Elites-European/Christian	2.41	3.60	9.34	2.09	2.68
Elites-Islamic	2.53	3.60	7.33	1.92	2.46
Publics-European/Christian	2.00	3.43	7.31	1.61	1.99
Publics-Islamic	2.10	3.47	6.51	1.59	1.99

Notes:

^a Importance of politics in R's life. Scale 1 (not at all important)–4 (very important).

^b It is good or bad having a democratic system. Scale 1 (it is very bad)–4 (it is very good).

^c Index of political action, based on answers to five indicators (signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, occupying buildings or factories) on a 3 point scale (have done, might do, would never do), so that the scale runs from 0 (would never do any of the five actions) to 15 (have done all five actions).

^d When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never? Scale 1 (never)–3 (frequently).

^e How interested would you say you are in politics? Scale 1 (not at all)–4 (very interested).

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al. 2004.

It must also be pointed out that Islamic publics seem to be more supporters of democracy and give more importance to politics than European publics, something that may be a result of the already mentioned underrepresentation of lower strata in Islamic samples, or of some disengagement from politics on the part of European publics. There are fewer differences between European and Islamic elites with respect to the five indicators of political values than between each elite and its corresponding public. The same is also true with respect to attitudes toward immigration policy. European and Islamic elites are more favourable (2.69 and 2.59 in a scale of 1–4) toward immigrant workers than their respective publics (2.51 and 2.46) (table 3.7).

European-Christian and Islamic societies differ greatly, even more than developed and less developed world regions, with respect to moral and religious values. No convergence in these values between European-Christian and Islamic elites seems to exist, at least at present. Islamic elites seem to be slightly less religious than their publics (though they go to the mosque more frequently than their publics), but they are much more religious than European-Christian elites and also more religious than European-Christian publics. Islamic elites also tend to justify certain behaviors related to new morals or ethics less than European-Christian elites

Table 3.7 Indicators of moral and religious values for elites and publics in European and Islamic Mediterranean countries

	Moral justification ^a	Social exclusion ^b	Importance of religion ^c	Church attendance ^d	Importance of God ^e
Elites-European/Christian	22.95	1.94	2.30	3.65	5.64
Elites-Islamic	10.66	3.25	3.62	5.03	9.05
Publics-European/Christian	16.81	2.60	2.83	4.76	6.97
Publics-Islamic	9.11	3.65	3.79	4.46	9.54

Notes:

^a Justification of homosexuality, abortion, divorce, and euthanasia. Scale from 1 (never) to 10 (always). The index varies between 4 (all are never justifiable) and 40 (all are always justifiable).

^b Would not like to have as neighbors any of eight social groups (people with a criminal record, people of a different race, heavy drinkers, emotionally unstable people, immigrants/foreign workers, people who have AIDS, drug addicts, and homosexuals. Scale varies from 0 (no group is rejected) to 8 (all groups are not liked as neighbors).

^c Importance of religion in R's life. Scale 1 (not at all important)–4 (very important).

^d Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? Scale of seven points: never or practically never, less often than once a year, once a year, only on special holidays, once a month, once a week, more than once a week.

^e How important is God in your life? Scale varies from 1 = not at all, to 10 = very.

Source: Elaboration of data from WVSEVS_sb_v4.SAV, in Inglehart et al. 2004.

and publics. Islamic elites and publics also show more exclusionist attitudes toward certain social groups than European-Christian elites and publics, as expected, since social exclusion is higher in less developed countries than in more developed ones, especially with regard to immigrant workers (Díez-Nicolás 2004b).

High importance of work has been considered characteristic of industrializing societies, while leisure seems to be more important in postindustrial societies. Therefore, one should expect elites in European-Christian societies to attach greater importance to leisure, while elites in Islamic societies should be expected to give more importance to work. Data confirms that Islamic elites attach the greatest importance to work, a finding that implies that Islamic countries have embarked on their process of industrialization, though their publics seem not to follow them very closely (3.87 and 3.53 in a scale of 1–4). But European-Christian elites also give more importance to work than their publics (3.59 and 3.38, respectively). These findings, which are very similar to those found when comparing developed and less developed countries, show that even in developed societies work continues to be very important (more than politics and religion, as the data has shown),

something that should not be a surprise since one's work or occupation continues to be the main source of income, and income is necessary to achieve and maintain the lifestyles and standard of living to which people aspire in present-day consumption societies. The importance of leisure, though greater in European-Christian elites and publics (3.29 and 3.06) than in Islamic elites and publics (2.96 and 2.84), is in all cases still lower than the importance of work.

Inasmuch as family values are usually closely related to moral and religious values, one would expect that differences between elites and publics in European-Christian and Islamic societies would follow a similar pattern to moral and religious values. To this effect an index of traditional family values has been constructed on the basis of answers to eight different questions.¹² There is no convergence between European and Islamic elites with respect to traditional family values and gender values, since they are closer to their respective publics than to each other. As expected, Islamic elites and publics are much more traditionally oriented toward family values (7.29 and 7.47 on a scale of 1–8) than their European-Christian counterparts (4.76 and 5.90 respectively). And values about gender equality leave no doubt that they constitute at present the greatest difference between European-Christian and Islamic societies (even in this case, where seven out of eight countries have a Catholic majority). While only 14 percent of European-Christian elites and 35 percent of European-Christian publics agree that when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women, the proportions who agree with that statement in Islamic societies is 67 percent among the elites and 72 percent among the publics.

Discussion of Results

Results have verified the validity and reliability of the instrument designed to measure elites and publics on the basis of a modified version of Galtung's social position index. At the same time, data have strongly supported the hypothesis that there is a high and positive correlation between social position and postmaterialism. In three different groups of countries defined on the degree of development, as well as when comparing European-Christian and Islamic societies around the Mediterranean, it has been shown that the index of postmaterialism is higher among those who occupy higher social positions, and vice versa.

The central argument in this research has been that there is a convergence of values between elites in more developed and in less developed

world regions, as well as between those in European-Christian and Islamic societies, which seems to be supported by the data. Thus, elites in European-Christian and Islamic societies seem to exhibit more similarities in their postmaterialist orientation with one another than they do with their respective publics. They also share greater similarities in terms of the five political indicators as well as in terms of their attitudes toward immigrant workers with one another than they do when compared with their respective publics.

However, this is not true with respect to moral and religious values, regarding social exclusion, or traditional and family values. When these values are considered, elites and publics of European-Christian societies manifest themselves as more tolerant and less religious, less exclusionist, and less traditionally oriented toward the family than elites and publics in Islamic societies. These differences are even greater than when comparing more developed and less developed countries.

The first modification of the main hypothesis stated, therefore, is that convergence of values among elites of European-Christian (more developed countries) and Islamic (less developed societies) is not the same regarding all kind of values. On the contrary, results seem to suggest that convergence is more evident with respect to political values and policy issues, but not with respect to moral, religious, family, and gender values. This finding is consistent with a similar result found when comparing values of immigrants to Spain with those of Spaniards and with those of their populations of origin. Immigrants showed values somewhat halfway between their populations of origin and the receiving Spanish population (Díez-Nicolás 2004b), but the data demonstrated that they were closer to Spaniards with respect to political and policy values than with respect to religious and family values. Apparently religious, moral, and family values are more difficult to change.

The second important modification is that some of the expected differences do not appear, or they do not appear with the expected intensity, because of the quality of the samples in less developed countries in general and in Islamic countries in particular, which are not really representative of their population. In these samples, the lower and more numerous socioeconomic strata are clearly underrepresented. Because of this underrepresentation, and given that postmaterialism seems to be much lower in the lower social positions, it seems plausible to think that Islamic and less developed countries would have significantly much lower scores on the postmaterialist scale, had those neglected lower social strata been included in the sample. This would have resulted in increasing the ratio of Islamic and less developed elites to their corresponding publics

and the ratio of European-Christian (developed) to Islamic (less developed) publics. As a result, the second hypothesis concerning the divergence between elites and publics in less developed countries (or between European-Christian and Islamic societies) and the even greater divergence between developed (European-Christian) and less developed (Islamic) publics would have been supported.

The third important finding is that all results derived from the comparison of more developed and less developed societies have been replicated, even more clearly, when comparing the more internally homogeneous European-Christian societies and Islamic societies. But it has been repeatedly found that the real gap between the two value systems refers to religious and gender role values more than to other kinds of values, including particularly political and democratic values. And the divergence between European-Christian and Islamic publics are smaller than expected, probably due to the fact that social peripheries in Islamic countries are also underrepresented, as manifested by the similar distributions in social position in European and Islamic societies.

The final test of the hypothesis has been carried out by reducing even more the societies that have been compared. More specifically, elites have been defined as the "decision-making nucleus" (social positions 12 and 13), and publics have been defined as the "extreme social periphery" (social position 0 and 1). When comparing these very restricted concepts of elites and publics, it was found that the postmaterialist index followed even more perfectly the expected pattern. That is, European-Christian elites show a postmaterialism index of 2.17, followed by the Islamic elites (1.89), the European-Christian publics (1.72), and the Islamic publics (1.57). All other results are not only maintained, but reinforced.

The underrepresentation of the lower socioeconomic strata in less developed and Islamic societies is likely hiding part of the divergence of values between elites and publics in those societies, as well as between European-Christian (developed) and Islamic (less developed) publics. But there seems to be no reasonable doubt about the convergence of political and policy values between elites, though great differences persist with respect to religious and moral values. One follow-up research question would be to explore the consequences of greater convergence between elites in developed and less developed societies and growing divergence between elites and publics within each society, especially when these processes are examined in the context of growing social and economic inequalities both among countries and within countries.

Notes

1. The eight characteristics used by Galtung were: sex, age, education, income, occupation, sector of economic activity, habitat of residence, and centrality. These characteristics were dichotomized, and it was considered that men, adults (neither the young nor the elderly), the more educated, those with higher incomes, those that had nonmanual occupations, working in the second or third sectors of the economy, and those living in urban or metropolitan areas and in places that were more dynamic (i.e., that had net positive immigration or some other sign of economic dynamism) were more rewarded than individuals who did not meet each of those criteria. The social position index was the result of getting one point for each of the characteristics mentioned that was met, and therefore could theoretically vary from 0 to 8.
2. The discussion of Fukuyama's arguments has been presented elsewhere (Díez-Nicolás 2003) and therefore will not be repeated here.
3. Countries (81) included in each world area: *Anglo Saxon* (Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and USA). *West European Catholic* (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland). *West European Protestant* (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Northern Ireland, Norway, and Sweden). *East European-Christian* (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia). *European Orthodox* (Armenia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro). *Latin American* (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Venezuela). *Islamic* (Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt). *Sinic-Confucian* (China, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Viet Nam). *Japan* (Japan). *India* (India). *Sub-Saharan Africa* (Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania). *Israel* (Israel). *Philippines* (Philippines).
4. Correlation coefficients: HDI-TRADRAT (.51), GNP-TRADRAT (.45), FHR-TRADRAT (.43), POSTMAT-TRADRAT (nonsignificant), HDI-POSTMAT (.60), GNP-POSTMAT (.80), FHR-POSTMAT (.57), HDI-GNP (.82), FHR-GNP (.68), HDI-FHR (.69).
5. Following Galtung's criteria regarding social rewards for different social positions, one point has been given to men and to respondents between 25 and 64 years of age (on the assumption that other characteristics being equal, men are socially more rewarded than women, and individuals 25-64 more rewarded than young individuals under 25 or those over 64 years). Education has been rated as 0 (incomplete secondary education or less), 1 (complete secondary education, including preparatory for university), and 2 (some university without degree or more). Employment status has been rated as follows: 0 (not employed), 1 (part-time employment), 2 (full-time and self-employed). Income has been rated country by country depending on their income distribution, aiming at three similar categories: 0 (low), 1 (medium), and 2 (high). Similarly, size of place of residence has been coded country by country to fit three categories: 0 (small), 1 (medium), and 2 (large). And occupation has also been coded country by country into four categories: 0 (never had an occupation), 1 (has or had a lower prestige occupation), 2 (medium prestige occupation), and 3 (high prestige occupation).
6. The countries that could not be included due to lack of information on some variable are: Georgia, New Zealand, Norway, China, El Salvador, Israel, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and Tanzania. Besides, one of the two data files for Colombia (1997) had to be excluded, as well as one of the two data files from Turkey (the WVS data file), because of the lack of information on some of the variables used to construct the social position index.
7. Indexes of dissimilarity are $\pm 1.9\%$ between the percent distributions of more developed and developing countries, $\pm 4.0\%$ between developing and less developed countries, and $\pm 4.4\%$ between more developed and less developed countries.

8. The use of countries or any other territorial units, like regions, as units of analysis always presents some important problems, even when samples are totally proportional and representative, and especially when average measures are calculated, due to the potential differences in internal variation on the variables under scrutiny within the different units, manifested on the well-known "ecological fallacy" (Robinson 1950). But these problems are absolutely unsolvable when the samples are not proportionally representative and they are used for description. These problems are nevertheless less important when analysis is not descriptive but causal or explanatory.
9. Two of the four items measure materialism: maintain order in the nation and fight rising prices, and two other items measure postmaterialism: give people more say in important political decisions and protect freedom of speech. Since respondents were asked to mention which of these goals was the most important goal for their country, and which one was the second-most important, the scale had a theoretical range from 1 (no postmaterialist item was mentioned either as first or second choice) to 3 (the two postmaterialist items were chosen as first and second choices), with an intermediate category (2) for those who chose one materialist and one postmaterialist item.
10. The eight European countries are all Catholic except Germany: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, with a total of 12,794 individuals. The eight Islamic countries are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, and Egypt, with a total of 13,707 individuals.
11. The index of dissimilarity between the two percent distributions is $\pm 4.0\%$, that is, similar to the one found between the more developed and the less developed countries in table 3.1.
12. One point was given for agreement with the following statements: regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them; parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being; a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily; a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled; marriage is not an outdated institution; a woman should not bring up a child as a single parent; a working mother cannot establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work; both the husband and wife should contribute to household income. The scale runs from 0 (not traditional at all) to 8 (very traditional).

References

- Bottomore, Tom 1964. *Elites and Society*. London: Watts.
- Carlton, Eric. 1996. *The Few and the Many: A Typology of Elites*. Brookfield, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Collier, Ruth B. 1999. *Paths towards Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Díez-Nicolás, Juan. 1966. "Posición Social y Opinión Pública." *Anales de Sociología* 2: 63–75.
- . 1968. "Social Position and Attitudes towards Domestic Issues in Spain." *Polls* 3(2): 1–15.
- . 1996. "Social Position, Information and Postmaterialism." *REIS* English edition, 153–65, Rumagraf, Madrid. Previously published in 1992 as "Posición Social, Información y Postmaterialismo." *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* 57: 21–36.
- . 1999. "Industrialization and Concern for the Environment." In *Modern Society and Values*, edited by N. Tos, P.Ph. Moler and B. Malnar, pp. 331–60. Ljubljana, FSS and Mannheim: ZUMA.
- . 2000. "La Escala de Postmaterialismo como Medida del Cambio de Valores en las Sociedades Contemporáneas." In *España 2000, entre el Localismo y la Globalidad. La Encuesta Europea de Valores en su Tercera Aplicación, 1981–1999*, edited by F. Andrés Orizo and J. Elzo, pp. 285–310. Madrid: Editorial Santa María

- . 2003. "Two Contradictory Hypotheses on Globalization: Social Convergence or Civilization Differentiation and Clash." In *Human Values and Social Change*, edited by R. Inglehart, pp. 235–63. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- . 2004a. *El Dilema de la Supervivencia*. Madrid: Obra Social Cajamadrid.
- . 2004b. *Las Dos Caras de la Inmigración*. Madrid: IMSERSO.
- Druckman, James N. and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. "Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4): 729–45.
- Duncan, Otis D. 1964. "Social Organization and the Ecosystem." In *Handbook of Modern Sociology*, edited by Robert E. L. Faris, pp. 37–82. Chicago: Rand Mc Nally and Co. Eldersveld, Samuel J., Lars Stromberg, and Wim Derksen. 1995. *Local Elites in Western Democracies: A Comparative Analysis of Urban Political Leaders in the U.S., Sweden and the Netherlands*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. (ed.). 1997. *Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization: A Collection of Readings*. New York: Garland Pub.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1991. *The End of History and Last Man*. New York: The Free Press.
- Galtung, Johan. 1964. "Foreign Policy Opinion as a Function of Social Position." *Journal of Peace Research* 1(3–4): 206–31.
- . 1976. "Social Position and the Image of the Future." In *Images of the World in the Year 2000*, edited by H. Ornauer, H. Wiberg, A. Sicinki, and J. Galtung, pp. 381–400. Paris: Mouton.
- Halle, Nils H. 1966. "Social Position and Foreign Policy Attitudes: A Comparative Study of France, Norway and Poland." *Journal of Peace Research* 3(1): 46–74.
- Hawley, Amos H. 1986. *Human Ecology. A Theoretical Essay*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1977. *The Silent Revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . (ed.). 2003a. *Human Values and Social Change*. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- . (ed.). 2003b. *Islam, Gender, Culture and Democracy*. Willowdale, ON: Sitter Publications.
- Inglehart, Ronald, Miguel Basáñez, Jaime Díez-Medrano, Loek Halman, and Ruud Luijkx (eds.). 2004. *Human Beliefs and Values*. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores.
- Keller, Suzanne. 1963. *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society*. New York: Random House.
- Kornhauser, William. 1959. *The Politics of Mass Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Lasswell, Harold. 1936. *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?* New York: McGraw Hill.
- . (ed.). 1952. *The Comparative Study of Elites*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Lerner, Robert, Althea K. Nagai, and Stanley Rothman. 2004. *American Elites*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press.
- Mannheim, Karl. 1935. *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure*. New York: Harcourt.
- Marger, Martin. 1981. *Elites and Masses: An Introduction to Political Sociology*. New York: D. van Nostrand Co.
- Mills, C. Wright. 1956. *The Power Elite*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moaddel, Mansoor. 2002. "The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 359–86.

- Mosca, Gaetano. 1939/1896. *The Ruling Class*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ortega y Gasset, José. 1929. *La Rebelión de las Masas*. Madrid: Revista de Occidente.
- Pareto, Vilfredo. 1902–1903. *Les Systèmes Socialistes*. Paris: Giard.
- Paul, David M. and Clyde Brown. 2001. "Testing the Limits of Elite Influence on Public Opinion. An Examination of Sports Facility Referendums." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (4): 871–88.
- Perthes, Volker. (ed.). 2004. *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Tessler, Mark. 2002. "Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(3–5): 229–49.
- van der Veer, Kees. 1976. "Social Position, Dogmatism and Social Participation as Independent Variables." In *Images of the World in the Year 2000*, edited by H. Ornauer, H. Wiberg, A. Sicinki, and J. Galtung, pp. 621–36. Paris: Mouton.
- Verba, Sidney, Steven Kelman, Gary Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuro Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree. 1987. *Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Walden, George. 2000. *The New Elites: Making a Career in the Masses*. London: Allen Lane.
- Welzel, Christian. 2002. "Effective Democracy, Mass Culture and the Quality of Elites." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(3–5): 317–35.
- Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart, and H.D. Klingemann. 2003. "The Theory of Human Development: A Cross-Cultural Analysis." *European Journal of Political Research* 42(2): 341–80.
- Werbner, Richard P. 2004. *Reasonable Radicals and Citizenship in Botswana: The Public Anthropology of Kalanga Elites*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Yoder, Jennifer A. 1999. *From East Germans to German? The New Postcommunist Elites*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.