

# Changing Values, Persisting Cultures

## *Case Studies in Value Change*

In 1981, the European and World Values surveys started the empirical investigation of cultural values on a global scale. This volume builds upon the findings of these surveys and analyzes value change in a number of key countries around the globe. The authors track value change and stability in their respective countries during the last decade (the last two decades where data are available) of the 20th century. All authors have been actively involved in value surveys and have a great deal of expertise in countries that they write on. Thus, the volume is a valuable complement to studies that deal with the topic from a global perspective without providing any detail about individual societies. The countries covered are: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, The Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United States.

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Edited by Thorleif Pettersson  
and Yilmaz Esmer

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Thorleif Pettersson and Yilmaz Esmer



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CHAPTER TEN

VALUES AND GENERATIONS IN SPAIN

JUAN DÍEZ-NICOLÁS

*Modernization and Post-Modernization in Spain*

For the study of values, the case of Spain is particularly interesting because of the vast changes this country has experienced in only a few decades. One should take into account the fact that Spain stayed out of the two World Wars, something that contributed to its relative isolation from the rest of the European continent, an isolation that was reinforced by the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the Franco dictatorship (1939–1975), which retarded the modernization process for several decades. In fact, economic modernization and full industrialization started in the 1960s, and was based on the increase of foreign currency that resulted from massive tourism into Spain, and from migrants' remittances to Spanish financial institutions. From 1939 to the late 1950s, Spain was an isolated and economically autarchic country ruled by a strong dictatorship based on a well defined "national-Catholicism." However, during the 15 years from 1960 to 1975, continuous economic development (as measured by high industrialization, high construction rates, and high per capita income increase) produced significant changes in the social structure (i.e., internal rural-urban migration flows, emergence of large urban middle classes, high rates of upward net social mobility, and a growing role of civic society), and changes in belief and value systems (i.e., rapid secularization and decline of Catholic practices and beliefs, growing disengagement from the fascist ideology prevalent during the 1940s, and emergence of a more pragmatic and technocratic life perspective), though political institutional change did not take place until the death of Franco in 1975. The so-called "peaceful political transition to democracy" took place in a very few years under the spirit of moderation and reform without real opposition from the remains of the Franco regime, and without recourse to revolutionary changes, as shown by the fact that, following two national elections (1977 and 1979), and the approval of

a new Constitution (1978), during the seven years of a center party democratic rule (1975–1982), the socialist party PSOE was able to win the national elections of 1982 by a large absolute majority. We do not have sufficient space here to explain in detail the changes that have taken place in Spain during the 1980s and 1990s, but suffice it to say that it joined the European Union in 1986 and was one of the countries that adopted the common European currency from the beginning, that its rate of economic growth has steadily been above 2.5% and above the European average for at least two decades, and that in only a few years (since 2000) it has received more than three millions foreigners, three quarters of whom are from less developed countries. It seems fair to say that Spain has reached the status of a post-industrial society in economic, social and political terms, as demonstrated by any indicator one might prefer.

The main objective of this chapter is to trace the changes that have taken place in Spaniards' values during different recent decades, as well as generational change. Our main hypothesis is that one should find great differences in Spaniards' value orientations at different times during the past two decades due to changes in the economic, social and political structures and processes. One should also find great differences between the value orientation of different generations since each generation was socialized in their early years under very different economic, social and political structures and processes.

### *The Concept of Generation*

The concept of generation has been widely used in the social sciences from its beginnings (Comte 1839, Cournot 1872, Ferrari 1874, Mannheim 1928, Eisenstadt 1956, Rintala 1963). A generation is not a cohort, but rather an aggregation of cohorts. A cohort refers to those who have been born in a specific year (Ryder 1965). The cohort is a well-accepted concept, especially in demography, because one can follow those born in a specific year (from January 1 to December 31) through their entire life, allocating demographic facts (which are generally reported on an annual basis) to the appropriate cohort according to the age that the cohort has in every particular year. However, there is no general consensus on the number of cohorts that form a generation, nor on the starting date of a generation, nor even on whether all generations are of the same length, and there is certainly no agreement

regarding the basis on which generations should be defined. Comte, Ferrari and Mannheim more or less agree that a generation comprises about 30 cohorts, and that it is defined on the basis of shared historical experiences. Ortega (1933) defined the generation as encompassing 15 cohorts, but Rintala thinks that, at present, generations last from 10 to 15 years, and even less.

Whatever the case, the concept of generation shares many of the limitations of any other abstract concept in terms of operationalization. For the purposes of this chapter, a generation will be defined on the basis of Ortega's 15 cohorts, while accepting that, in recent years, as a result of accelerated social change, generations may be approaching a 10 cohorts or even less. It seems more important, instead, to specify and justify from the very beginning the definition of the particular cohorts in contemporary Spain that will be used, in order to understand the change in value orientations that seems to have taken place in Spanish society in recent decades.

The following analysis has been based on data collected in Spain by the three waves of the European Values Study (1981, 1990 and 1999), and the three waves of the World Values Surveys (1990, 1995 and 2000), thus providing a total of more than 10,000 interviews over a period of 20 years.<sup>1</sup>

### *Generations in Contemporary Spain*

The main basis for the definition of Spanish generations has been the Civil War (1936–39). This is due to the impact it had in defining a “before” and “after”, and because it influenced the life of Spaniards not only during the three years that it lasted, but for the following 40 years until Franco's death in 1975, when the restoration of democracy opened a new historical era through the process of peaceful political transition (Díez-Nicolás 1993, 1995, 1996b).

The cohorts used for this research replicate those defined and used to study the political preferences of Spaniards before the legislative elections in March 1996 (Díez-Nicolás 1996a), which provided a pre-electoral explanation of why the change of political preferences of the

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<sup>1</sup> The aggregate data file used is the official data file: World Values Survey Association and European Values Study, *xwvsevs\_1981\_2000\_v20060423\_por.sav* produced by ASEP/JDS, Tilburg University and Central Archive.



youngest generation (1967–1981) towards a less leftist orientation might lead to the victory of the right Popular Party, putting an end to 14 years of Socialist government (1982–1996). The electoral results confirmed this forecast, providing some credibility to the instrumental definition of generations that had been used for that analysis.

The names given to cohorts have been based not on the historical facts of what was happening when they were born, but instead on the historical events that took place when they were in the middle of their adolescent years, the crucial years of socialization when individuals consolidate their beliefs and values. Thus, the central cohort of the “Republic-Civil War” generation, born in 1914, was 18 years old in 1932, only one year after the Second Spanish Republic was proclaimed, and it was 35 years old in 1949, one year before Spain was admitted to the United Nations, an event that put an end to the period of international diplomatic and economic isolation that the country had been suffering since 1946. The oldest cohort of this generation, born in 1907, reached 18 years of age in 1925, six years before the proclamation of the Republic, and was 35 years old in 1939, just as the Civil War ended and World War Two started. The youngest cohort, born in 1921, was 18 years old in 1939, the year the Civil War ended, and 35 years old in 1956, when the technocrats of the *Opus Dei* started the reforms of the economy that preceded the start of economic development in the 1960s. It seems that this generation lived and was influenced throughout the most important part of their lives by the Republic and the Civil War on the one hand, and the Post-war and the Isolation and Autarchy period on the other hand, about thirty years marked by deprivation and scarcity as well as by violence and war, and the toughest period of Franco’s dictatorship, when the Phalangist party, the military and the Catholic Church controlled most of Spanish life.

The “Post-war-Isolation” generation<sup>2</sup> was exposed for the most important part of their lives to the post-war and isolation period of

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<sup>2</sup> The central cohort of the “Post-war-Isolation” generation was born in 1929 (the year of the Great Depression after the New York stock market crash), reached the age of 18 years in 1947, two years after the end of World War Two and three years before Spain’s admittance to the United Nations, and it reached the age of 35 years in 1964, when the first Economic and Social Development Plan (1964–68) was launched by the more liberal and technocratic government appointed in 1961. The oldest cohort of this generation was 18 years in 1940, only one year after the end of the Civil War, and it reached 35 in 1957, when the economic measures for stabilizing the economy

scarcity, but then experienced the benefits of economic and social development that took place during the 1960s. It is the generation that best experienced the significant economic and social changes that took place during the period 1955–1970: the change from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy, the great internal population movements from rural to urban-industrial centers, the migration flows to other more developed central and northern European countries, the reception of millions of tourists, the beginning of the secularization of Spanish society, the birth of television in Spain, a relative freedom of the press, the beginning of some relative political freedoms, the beginning of mass consumption, but also the beginning of important changes in value orientations that were the result of greater economic and personal security.

The “Economic development” generation has been the most central during the twentieth century in Spain, and it may be considered as the bridge between the previous more traditional generations and the subsequent and more modern ones.<sup>3</sup> For the most part, this generation

Table 1. Definition of contemporary Spanish generations

Generation	Central cohort	18 years in:	Name of Generation	35 years in:	Protagonists of: Post-war & Autarchy
1907–21	1914	1925–39	Republic-Civil War	1942–56	
1922–36	1929	1940–54	Post-war & Autarchy	1957–71	Economic development
1937–51	1944	1955–69	Economic development	1972–86	Transition to democracy
1952–66	1959	1970–84	Transition to democracy	1987–01	Democracy consolidation
1967–81	1974	1985–99	Democracy consolidation	2002–16	Globalization
1982–96	1989	2000–14	Globalization	2017–31	?


were adopted, while the youngest cohort was 18 years old in 1954 and 35 in 1971, only two years before the first oil crisis and five years before Franco’s death.

<sup>3</sup> The central cohort of this generation was born in 1944 and turned 18 in 1962, one year after the appointment of a new more “open” cabinet and two years before the launching of the first Economic and Social Development Plan. It reached 35 in 1979, when the second legislative elections of the new democracy were held. It is therefore the generation that was definitely marked by the political transition to democracy. Its oldest cohort, born in 1937, was 18 in 1955, and 35 in 1972, while its youngest cohort, born in 1951, turned 18 in 1969, and 35 in 1986 (the year when the Socialist Party won its second legislative elections, the fourth elections since the beginning of democracy in 1976).

was born after the Civil War, and it therefore lived its most important adult years during a 30-year period experiencing the beginning of the economic reforms during the mid 1950s, the economic and social development during the 1960s, and the political changes of the transition to democracy during the 1970s and early 1980s. It has been central in more than one sense, as will be shown later, but it embodies, better than any other generation, the spirit of reform (economic, social and political) that characterized the late years of the Franco regime and the first two democratically elected governments of the UCD (Union of the Democratic Centre) in 1977 and 1979. This generation had a prominent role in leading the peaceful political transition from a dictatorship to a full democracy, showing a very visible change in their value orientations (religious, economic, political, family, work, moral, etc.).

The following generation, the “Transition to democracy” generation, was born during the years of economic development (1952–1966). Most of their members, reaching their young-adulthood more or less when the transition to democracy took place (1970–1984), and reaching 35 during the Socialist governments of the late 1980s and early 1990s,<sup>4</sup>

Figure 10.1. Percent Postmaterialists (12 items), Spain, 1988–2000



<sup>4</sup> Its central cohort, born in 1959, was 18 years old precisely the year that the first democratic elections were held (1977), and it was 35 in 1994, the year of great political scandals that led the Socialist Party to its first defeat in the 1996 elections 1996, when the Popular Party won its first elections.

never knew what scarcity and deprivation really meant. This generation collectively experienced the events that took place between 1970 and 2000, 30 years that were marked by the transition to democracy after Franco's death in 1975, the UCD governments of 1977 and 1979, and the Socialist governments of 1982, 1986 and 1993, and, later, the Popular governments of 1996 and 2000. This generation, therefore, has lived for the most part in a democratic political system, and can be considered as the first to have almost no memory of the Franco regime (the oldest cohort reached 18 years of age only five years before the Franco era ended). It did not participate actively in the process of change, but benefited fully from the economic, social and political changes that had already taken place. From an economic perspective, this generation took advantage during its childhood of the affluence of the 1960s and early 1970s; it had to cope in young adulthood with the high inflation rates of the late 1970s, but then experienced the economic boom of the 1980s and the uncertainties of the 1990s. In addition, this generation has had to compete with greater number of peers, since the cohorts of the first part of the 1960s have been the most numerous of the twentieth century in Spain, due to very high fertility rates during the period 1960–1965.

The “Democracy consolidation” generation is the last one that will be considered here, since it was born during 1967–1981 and, therefore, none of its cohorts had reached the age of 35 by 2000 (the year of the last wave of surveys that will be analyzed here). This is the generation, however, that arrived at its young adulthood during the final years of Socialist governments, and probably voted for the first time in 1996, when the Popular Party won its first elections. They experienced the great economic and political scandals of the last Socialist governments when they were young, and have lived under Popular governments most of their young-adulthood, since the oldest of them were 37 when the last legislative elections were held in 2004. About half of the cohorts of this generation were already born after Franco died, and the other half was at most eight years of age when he died. It is very likely that this generation will be the first one to really experience the consequences of globalization, since they were mainly in their “teens” when Spain joined the Economic European Community in 1986, and when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. This cohort has not known post-war poverty and scarcity, but, after having experienced the extraordinary economic affluence and mass consumption of the 1980s when they were children, they experienced high unemployment rates amongst



the young during the early 1990s. Therefore, they have experienced the fear of not reaching the economic levels of their families of origin, of not finding jobs that will be in accordance with their higher than ever educational achievements, of not being able to finance adequate housing, and of having to compete with a greater number of peers that have also acquired a higher education. This generation, finally, seems to rely more on their “social networks” than on their own personal merits to get ahead in life.

There is also another generation, here denominated the “Globalization” generation, which has not yet begun to play a role in Spanish life. Born between 1982 and 1996, their oldest cohort was 20 years old in 2002; thus only the cohort of 1982 was able to vote in the 2000 legislative elections, and only the five oldest cohorts were able to vote in the last elections of 2004. The oldest cohort of this generation was 14 years old when the Popular Party won the 1996 elections, and so this generation has only experienced this party in power, but had no direct experience of Socialist governments (until the PSOE won the last elections in 2004), just as they have no direct knowledge of the “cold war”. Given the rather small number of individuals belonging to this generation in our surveys, will be not be included in the analysis presented below.

For the sake of brevity, one could say that the “Republic-Civil War” generation members experienced deprivation and scarcity during most of their lives, from childhood to late adulthood although they have benefited from the higher retirement pensions of a more prosperous and comprehensive welfare state. Politically speaking, some minority groups within this generation were either very “pro-Franco” or very “anti-Franco”, but most of them would claim to be “apolitical.” The “Post-war and Isolation” generation lived through childhood in deprivation and poverty, but in their adulthood they personally experienced the meaning of economic development and the benefits of a new consumption society, as well as the benefits of the welfare state when they reached retirement. Politically speaking this generation was mainly “pro-Franco”, or apolitical, because opposition to the regime not allowed, so only the politically very conscious ones risked taking an active role against the dictatorship. The “Economic development” generation only had a short experience of years of scarcity, but soon began to experience the benefits of the economic and social development of the 1960s and 1970s, along with the difficult years of long unemployment and early retirement during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In political

terms, this generation was very conscious of the need to promote political change. It was attracted by the ideal of building the bridge from Franco's authoritarian (or late soft dictatorship) regime to democracy, and therefore was for the most part supportive of the "reform" process that President Suarez, as the leader of the centre party UCD, and the constitutional King Juan Carlos, represented. This generation, as with the previous one, experienced generally harder economic conditions when they were younger, but better economic conditions as they grew older. As for the "Transition to democracy" generation, it experienced economic development during childhood and youth, it achieved higher educational levels than previous generations, and it had to compete more for jobs, due to higher collective educational levels and to greater numbers resulting from the high fertility rates during the early 1960s. This generation also had to face high unemployment rates during the early 1990s. Therefore, and unlike the previous generation, this generation has experienced relatively good economic conditions throughout most of their lives. Politically speaking, they were, for the most part, supportive of the Socialist Party, and so contributed greatly to its electoral victories in 1982, 1986, 1989, and 1993. Finally, the "Democracy consolidation" generation is the first one to have experienced better economic conditions during childhood and youth than at later ages, to the point that, given the more competitive conditions they have to face, as well as their higher expectations for good jobs and housing derived from increasingly higher life-style standards, they have postponed their separation from their parents until after the age of 30, and they have reduced their fertility to the lowest rates ever known in Spain and in most other developed countries. In political terms they seem to have contributed significantly to the first victory of the Popular Party in 1996 and to the next one in 2000.

Table 2. Distribution of each Spanish wave's sample by generation


	1981	1990	1995	2000	Total
1907–1921	20.4%	8.9%	7.3%	4.1%	10.2%
1922–1936	23.9	20.6	21.7	18.6	21.0
1937–1951	24.3	23.5	20.5	20.9	22.7
1952–1966	31.4	32.6	26.8	25.2	29.8
1967–1981	–	14.5	23.6	30.3	16.1
1982–1996	–	–	–	1.0	.2
Total	(2,303)	(4,147)	(1,211)	(2,409)	(10,070)

**Value Change in Spanish Society: Generation Effects and Period Effects** Monthly data collected by ASEP (Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos, Madrid) from 1988 to the present (more than 200 national surveys with samples of about 1,200 persons each, representative of the Spanish population 18 and over), using Inglehart's 12-item scale (Inglehart 1990:74–5), show a steady increase of post-materialist values from 1988 to 1999, though a change of trend seems to have taken place since the beginning of 2000, a change that has persisted in the following years (not shown here since the present analysis will be carried to 2000, the year of the last WVS wave conducted in Spain).

In view of the summary given above, it should be expected that value-orientation changes in Spain should be related both to period and age, that is, to generation. Data from the World Values and the European Values surveys, and from other surveys conducted in the last two decades, seem to confirm a general trend from scarcity-survival values towards self-expression values. On the basis of data collected through the four waves conducted in 1981, 1990, 1995, and 2000, it is clear that the Spanish population seems to have changed systematically from a relatively more scarcity-survival value orientation in 1981, to an increasingly self-expression value orientation in 1990, 1995, and 2000, thus following the expected direction of change.

However, the change in the other dimension seems to have had a temporal backward change in 1995, although the general trend from 1981 to 2000 seems to follow the expected direction from traditional to secular-rational values. This reversal of the trend in 1995, which implies a certain return to more traditional values, might be a consequence of various factors, including methodological or sampling differences, but, after a close examination of the data, it seems that these factors must be discarded. The only possible methodological explanation might be the fact that the sample in 1995 is the smallest of all waves, and considering that the number of respondents who answer all the items to build the traditional/secular-rational scale is generally about a third of the total sample, this may well have affected the index for this wave. However, a more plausible explanation is that the events that took place in Spain during the previous years (very high unemployment rates in 1992–94, great economic scandals attributed to Government officials and to the party in power, a certain disenchantment with how democracy was working, and great uncertainties about the future) may have jointly contributed to a certain return to more traditional (conservative) values as a reaction to the progressive values that were

Figure 10.2. Values in Spain, by Wave




encouraged during the fourteen years of socialist government. Had the 1995 wave be conducted in a different year, it probably would have obtained different results, proving the importance of the social context in which a survey is conducted. Whatever the explanation, however, the fact is that, in 1999–2000, the plot of the combined position of the traditional/secular-rational value and the survival-self expression value is in line with the 1981 and 1990 values, showing a very steady rate of change consistent with theoretical expectations.

On the other hand, without exception, the change of values between generations follows the pattern that was predicted by Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism that we have already referred to. However, there are some points that must be emphasised. First, it may be noticed that the difference between the two oldest generations is smaller than the difference between the second oldest and the generation that has been considered central, the "Economic development" generation (born between 1937 and 1951), which, as was noted above, was the generation that supported the greater responsibility in carrying out the political transition to democracy. It may also be noticed that the difference in values between the two youngest generations is also smaller than the difference between the less young one and the "Economic development"



Figure 10.3. Values in Spain, by Generation



generation. In other words, the central generation, i.e. the “Economic development” generation, seems to have been the one breaking away more significantly with the past (that is, with preceding generations that are more directly influenced by the Civil War and the Franco regime). But, at the same time, this generation also differs significantly from the subsequent generation. The data seems to confirm the very distinctive role played by the “Economic development” generation as a bridge between the past and the future. This generation buried the “old regime”, gave birth to democracy and to the 1978 Constitution, and supported a political party, the UCD, which carried on a centrist and reformist program equidistant from the left and the right. In so doing, they facilitated the task of the following generations, which broke away even more profoundly with the value systems of the past, adopting a more secular-rational and a more self-expressive orientation.


As has been said, the change of values between the five generations that have coexisted in twentieth century Spain is consistent with the theory. But there seems to be an inconsistency regarding a certain drawback in traditional values in 1995 for which a plausible interpretation has been given above. However, it seems appropriate to examine the change in values by wave and generation simultaneously.

Table 3. Values in Spain by wave and generation

	1097-21		1922-36		197-51		1952-66		1967-81	
	Surv- Self	Trad- Rat	Surv- Self	Trad- Rat	Surv- Self	Trad- Rat	Surv- Self	Trad- Rat	Surv- Self	Trad- Rat
1981	-.64	-.31	-.37	-.04	-.22	-.06	.05	.49	-	-
1990	-.56	-.21	-.25	-.17	.07	.18	.36	.65	.44	.74
1995	-.42	-.50	-.29	-.22	.20	.07	.41	.35	.69	.57
1999-00	-.11	-.30	-.11	.01	.07	.26	.56	.69	.62	.89

As the data in Table 3 show, traditional-secular rational values vary from one generation to the next in the expected manner in each of the four dates for which data were collected. In each one of the four dates, older generations show more traditional values, while younger generations show more secular-rational values. There is not one single exception. But, following each generation through the four waves, the expected pattern of decreasing traditional values (and increasing secular-rational values) with time is irregular. They all show a certain return to more traditional values in 1995, following the pattern already established for the Spanish population as a whole. But all generations also show a recovery towards more secular-rational values in 1999–2000 as compared with 1995. Therefore, save for a methodological error in the 1995 data, the only possible explanation seems to be that there were certain events that had such great impact on people's attitudes as to significantly change their value orientations. The only possible events that seem to meet those requirements is the relative discredit of progressive (as opposed to traditional) attitudes that resulted after a period of three years of political and economic scandals attributed to the incumbent national government at the time, together with economic difficulties not experienced in the preceding years. In this respect, public opinion data collected monthly by ASEP demonstrates that an indicator that is included every month, measuring satisfaction with how democracy works in Spain, obtained its lowest values from the beginning of 1994 to the end of 1995, in a monthly time series running from October 1986 to the present. During those two years, satisfaction with how democracy was working not only reached its worst ratings, but for several months the number of those unsatisfied was higher than those who were satisfied.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The data for this and other permanent monthly political and economic indicators, such as satisfaction with the Government's performance, or the consumer sentiment

Figure 10.4. Values change through time in Spain, by generation<sup>a</sup>

In general terms, therefore, Spanish data for four waves and five generations confirm the expected trend of value change towards more secular-rational (less traditional) values, and towards more self-expression (less survival or scarcity) values. The evidence, however, seems to show that generation change has been greater than period change, a finding that, excluding very important events such as those mentioned for Spain prior the 1995 wave, is also frequent in other societies that have experienced rapid social change, as has been the case for Spain. To find further evidence for this assertion, an analysis of the influence of generation and period (wave) on different sets of values regarding the family, socialization of children, religion, politics, ethics and other similar aspects of life has been conducted in order to verify that generational rather than period effects are more important in explaining values change among Spaniards, and that the change has always been in the direction towards more self-expression, and in general, too, towards more secular-rational, values.

#### *Generations and Family Values*

Spaniards, like citizens of many other countries, attribute more importance to the family than to other aspects of their life: work, friends,

index and its main components, (evaluation of the national and personal economic situations) may be found in ASEP's surveys collection on Spaniards' Public Opinion, in ASEP/JDS Data Bank ([www.jdsurvey.net](http://www.jdsurvey.net)).

leisure, religion and politics. The average importance attributed to the family (3.8 points on a four point scale) has not varied at all between 1990 and 2000, and in general has been somewhat higher among the three oldest generations and lower among the two youngest generations, but the differences are very small.

Eight items regarding attitudes towards the family have been used to construct an index of traditional values towards the family.<sup>6</sup> This index varies between 0 and 7 with higher scores indicating higher levels of traditional family values. As expected, this index is positively correlated with the importance attributed to the family ( $r = .16$ ) and by has a rather high negative correlation with the rational-secular values ( $r = -.44$ ) as measured by the traditional-secular/rational values index.

The index calculated for each wave and family shows that traditional values towards the family are always higher for the oldest generation and lowest for the youngest generation in each of the four periods. But these values seem to have increased from the initial wave of 1981 to the wave of 1995, and then to have decreased. The first relationship seems to fit the expected pattern, in the sense that, at any particular point in time, Spaniards' values towards the family are more traditional in the older the generations. But the second relationship suggests that, as the members of a particular generation grow older, their values regarding the family become more traditional, though they have decreased slightly,

Table 4. Index of orientation towards traditional family's values, by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	4.57	5.58	5.86	5.79
1922–1936	4.15	5.42	5.53	5.51
1937–1951	3.78	4.85	5.07	5.01
1952–1966	2.96	4.01	4.33	4.20
1967–1981	–	3.93	4.11	3.73

<sup>6</sup> The index was constructed on the basis of agreement with the following statements: “regardless of what the qualities and faults of one’s parents are, one must always love and respect them”; “parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being”; “a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily” and “a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled”; and disagreement with these other statements: “marriage is an out-dated institution”; “a woman wanting to have a child as a single parent”; “a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work”; and “being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay”.



but consistently, for each generation, between 1995 and 1999–2000. Considering the comment regarding the return to more traditional values in 1995, it could well be that the apparent decrease in traditional values towards the family in 1995 was a result of it having reached a peak in 1995. A regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the index of traditional values towards the family, and the predictors are wave and generation, shows that generation is inversely and more significantly related to traditional values than wave, which in turn is related positively to it. But, when several socio-demographic variables are controlled for, the effect of wave disappears, while completed education is the only other predictor that shows a significant, and negative, relationship with traditional values towards the family.<sup>7</sup> In other words, this analysis suggests that Spaniards who have a higher education and belong to younger generations have a less traditional concept of the family than those with a lower education and belonging to older generations.

Related to family values are values regarding gender equality. An index of favorable attitudes towards gender equality has been constructed on the basis of four items that seem to be part of the same factor, according to a principal component analysis.<sup>8</sup>

Again, the differences among generations in each of three dates are remarkable, showing attitudes increasingly more favorable to gender equality among the youngest generations, and less favorable among the oldest generations. But the time sequence does not match with what is expected, as respondents in 1995 seem to be more favorable to gender equality than those in 1999–2000. Generation and wave are significantly related to gender equality attitudes, even when controlling for gender, education, employment status, and social class. The relationship with generation is positive, meaning that the younger the generation the more favorable their attitudes are towards gender equality, but it is negative with wave, and this may be explained by the fact that the social and

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<sup>7</sup> The control variables in the regression model were sex (male), highest completed education, employment status, and social class.

<sup>8</sup> The index was constructed on the basis of agreement with the statements that “both husband and wife should contribute to the household income”, and disagreement with the statements that “men make better political leaders than women,” that “university education is more important for men than for women,” and that “when jobs are scarce men have more right to a job than women.”

Table 5. Index of attitudes towards gender equality, by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	–	1.00	2.33	1.80
1922–1936	–	1.24	2.54	1.95
1937–1951	–	1.30	2.84	2.14
1952–1966	–	1.52	3.16	2.38
1967–1981	–	1.64	3.38	2.47

political context in which the 1995 sample was taken was exceptional, as has been explained. The trend from 1990 to 2000 goes in the expected direction, but gender equality attitudes seem to have been much more pronounced in 1995 than in 1990 and 2000, accounting for the negative relationship. The regression model explains 14% of the total variance, and it is important to underline that women are significantly more in favor of gender equality than men, and that education and employment status are positively related to favorable attitudes towards gender equality, but social class is negatively related. Social class has been defined in this analysis by combining two different indicators used by EVS and WVS in their surveys: subjective social class and an index of socio-economic status. But the relationships of the two variables and the combined variable used in this analysis on the one hand, and the gender equality index constructed for this purpose are all negative, a result that implies that the upper social strata are more conservative. To confirm this assertion, the traditional-rational/secular values (trad-rat index) correlates positively and significantly with the gender equality index ( $r = .17$ ), implying that more secular-rational individuals are more favorable to gender equality than more traditional individuals, but it correlates negatively and significantly ( $r = -.11$ ) with subjective social class, and shows no significant relationship with the other two social class indicators.

#### *Generations and Social Exclusion*

According to the theoretical framework of cultural change which has been adopted for this analysis, social exclusion is more characteristic of traditional societies, and it should decrease in more industrial and post-industrial societies. Exclusionist attitudes have generally been measured by asking about different social groups one would not like as neighbors, so that thirteen of these groups have been included in the

different waves, though not all of them were included in all surveys.<sup>9</sup> A principal component analysis shows that there are three different types of socially excluded groups by Spaniards. One is composed (in order of saturation) of immigrants/foreign workers, people of a different race, Jews, Muslims and people with large families. The second component includes (also in order of saturation) drug addicts, people who have AIDS, homosexuals, people with a criminal record and heavy drinkers. And the third component includes right wing extremists and left wing extremists. Emotionally unstable people do not seem to correspond to any of these three groupings.

Four indexes of social exclusion have been calculated, one including all twelve items (all but the emotionally unstable), and one for each of the three components mentioned above. The correlation coefficients among the four indicators are all high and statistically significant, and the four of them are significantly and negatively correlated with rational values on the traditional-rational/secular scale, implying that the more traditionally oriented individuals tend to hold more exclusionist attitudes than the more rational/secular oriented.

Exclusionist attitudes have been very infrequent among Spaniards. When all 13 groups in the “neighbors battery” of the questionnaires are taken into account, the highest average of groups mentioned as not being desirable as neighbors is always below five. When only the five racial/ethnic groups included in the first component are considered, the average of groups mentioned is always below one. The data in Table 6 also demonstrate that social exclusion of minority groups characterized by some particular behavior as those in component two (drug addicts, people with AIDS, homosexuals, former criminals and heavy drinkers) are more socially excluded than ethnic or racial minorities (immigrants/foreign workers, people of a different race, Jews, Muslims and also people with large families, probably assimilated to foreign or ethnic groups). In fact, when the 1990 and 1999–2000 waves are compared, it is evident that, although both types include five groups each, ethnic-racial minority groups are less rejected as neighbors (averages below one) than social minority groups (averages between 1.21 and 2.72).

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<sup>9</sup> Muslims, people with AIDS, drug addicts, homosexuals and Jews were omitted in the 1981 wave, while Jews, left extremists, right extremists and people with large families were omitted in the 1995 wave. Many other social groups that were included in only one wave have also been omitted in this analysis, as they did not allow a time comparison.

Table 6. Indicators of social exclusion, by wave and generation

	1981		1990		1995		2000	
	Total	1	Total	1	Total	1	Total	1
1907–1921	–	–	4.57	.97	–	–	3.43	.71
1922–1936	–	–	3.86	.60	–	–	3.61	.64
1937–1951	–	–	3.44	.50	–	–	3.18	.53
1952–1966	–	–	2.62	.34	–	–	2.65	.50
1967–1981	–	–	2.47	.32	–	–	1.97	.22

	1981		1990		1995		2000	
	2	3	2	3	2	3	2	3
1907–1921	–	.56	2.72	.63	2.57	–	2.01	.46
1922–1936	–	.51	2.38	.62	2.28	–	2.11	.67
1937–1951	–	.48	2.14	.53	1.81	–	1.82	.59
1952–1966	–	.43	1.54	.50	1.35	–	1.52	.55
1967–1981	–	–	1.53	.39	1.38	–	1.21	.43

However, although averages for the third type of groups are also below one, one should remember that only two extremist groups are included in this third component (left and right extremists), so that an average of 0.5 is 25% of the maximum possible average, and comparatively they seem to be more excluded than the five social groups mentioned on the second component, and much more excluded than the five racial/ethnic groups included in component one.

The data in Table 6 also shows that social exclusion of any type of groups has decreased among Spaniards with time, and it has also decreased in younger generations as compared to the older ones. Thus, if the total indicator is taken into account, it is evident that all averages have declined for each generation between 1990 and 2000 (with the only minor exception of the 1952–1966 generation). And in both waves, without exception, the younger the generation is, the lower the level of exclusion. Similar trends are found when comparing generations on the average for the first component (racial/ethnic groups) in 1990 and 2000, but there are some exceptions when comparing the values for the same generation in the two waves (probably because exclusion is so low). The generation and wave comparisons for 1990, 1995, and 2000 also show similar trends in general when referring to the social groups in the second component, exceptions being few and very small. But, when one compares the groups in the third component (left and right extremists) in waves 1981, 1990 and 2000, the generation pattern



is also maintained (exclusionism decreases the younger the generation is, with the sole exception of the older generation, 1907–1921 in 2000 as compared with the 1922–36 generation), but the comparison of each generation in the three waves shows in general an increase, and not a decrease, in exclusionism of the two groups. This implies that Spaniards of any generation have been increasing their rejection of political extremist groups, no matter whether they are right or left.

Generation explains a greater proportion of the variance in social exclusion attitudes than wave (in each of the four indicators of exclusion), but, as was seen above, both are negatively related to exclusionism. The power of generation as predictor is maintained even when other socio-demographic variables are controlled (gender, education, employment status and social class), none of which adds significantly to the explanation in the presence of generation (with the only exception of education when the dependent variable is social exclusion of social minority groups, in which case the more educated are less exclusionists of drug addicts, people with AIDS, homosexuals, former criminals and heavy drinkers, than the less educated).

The results of this analysis confirm results of more than fifteen annual surveys since 1991, all national representative samples of the Spanish population, that show a very low level of racism, xenophobia or social exclusion among Spaniards, especially regarding immigrants (Díez-Nicolás 2005). Results of those surveys also show lower exclusion of immigrants than of other social minority groups (drug addicts, homosexuals, etc.).

#### *Generations and Political Values*

Change in cultural values in Spain has been greatly influenced by the political transition to democracy that started in 1975 with the death of Franco. This is something that must be taken into account when examining value change in any domain, but especially when analyzing political values. Political attitudes had certainly developed before the political transition, but they manifested themselves more openly when the dictatorship disappeared. Contrary to what many politicians and analysts expected, Spaniards faced the political transition with great moderation, disengaging themselves from nostalgic desires to maintain the old regime as well as from revolutionary ideals. Reform and change were the mottos of the centrist governments of 1977 and 1979, and the socialist governments of 1982, 1986, 1989, and 1993, respectively.

Table 7. Ideological self-anchoring average on a scale 0 (left) to 10 (right), by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	5.69	5.31	5.45	5.43
1922–1936	5.09	5.25	5.10	5.32
1937–1951	4.86	4.73	4.95	4.96
1952–1966	4.24	4.16	4.38	4.59
1967–1981	–	4.60	4.79	4.34

That is why Spaniards' ideological center of gravity was at the very centre at the beginning of the political transition and, since 1982, has maintained itself between the center and the center left.

Using a 10-point self placement scale of left-right ideology (where the higher the scale value the more to the right the individual places himself/herself), the means for Spaniards range between a minimum of 4.16 and a maximum of 5.69 (i.e., between the center-left and the center right, and the results are the same when we use a seven-point scale with labels. As expected, young generations always place themselves a little to the left, while older generations place themselves a little more to the right. Only on two occasions, in 1990 and 1995, the 1967–1981 did a generation place itself slightly to the left but closer to the centre than the previous generation, probably marking distances with a socialist government that had lasted for eight or 13 years, respectively, for these two generations. On the other hand, variations between consecutive waves were probably affected by the political context in which each wave was conducted and by the proximity of elections. Thus, all generations seem to have changed a little towards the left between 1981 and 1990, probably reflecting the impact of the large absolute majorities of the socialist party in the 1982, 1986, and 1989 elections. Then, there was a small but consistent change towards the right in 1995, announcing the victory of the conservative party in the 1996 elections, and a continuing small change towards the right again in 2000, when the conservative party won the elections by an absolute majority. Only the very young 1967–1981 generation turned more significantly towards the left in 2000, probably because they aimed again for a new change.

This well known preference of Spaniards for a center ideological position also manifests itself in the overwhelming preference for the statement “our society must be gradually improved by reforms,” as against the opinion of very small minorities which express that “our

society must be radically changed” or “the existing social order must be valiantly defended.” But, at the same time, it must be stressed that, in the 1981 and 1990 waves, when the government was socialist; equality was preferred to freedom by the three oldest generations, while freedom was preferred by the two youngest generations. However, in 2000, when the government became conservative, freedom was preferred to equality by all generations.

Regarding preference for democracy, in the last two waves, 1995 and 2000, respondents were asked to show the importance they attributed, using a four point scale, to four different types of government: strong leader, a government of experts, having the army rule, and having a democratic government. Democratic government is clearly preferred by all generations, and in the two waves, to the other three forms of government, but a government of experts is preferred to having a strong leader, and even more to having the army rule. In general, each generation has shown less preference for any of those three forms of government in 2000 than in 1995, but it must be noted that a democratic system government enjoys somewhat less support in 2000 when compared with 1995.

Finally, with regard not to attitudes, but to behavior, five political action items (signing a petition, joining in boycotts, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories) have been aggregated on a political action index that could vary between 0 and 15 points (since there were three optional responses for each item, “have done”, “might do” and “would never do”).

The data suggest that political action score is always greater in younger generations, although the level of political action is generally low (always below six points when the maximum number of points possible is 15). Political action in each generation, however, decreased from 1981 to 1990, increased in 1995, and diminished again in 2000. These fluctuations are probably related to the events around each wave.

Table 8. Political action, by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	5.42	4.48	5.09	5.22
1922–1936	6.30	5.42	5.72	5.58
1937–1951	6.97	6.18	7.00	6.47
1952–1966	8.05	7.52	7.45	7.34
1967–1981	–	7.11	7.76	7.66

Using a regression model it has been possible to show that political action is related positively to generation (younger generations show more political action) and negatively related to wave (each generation shows decreasing political action with time). But these relationships are maintained when controlling for sex, education, social class and employment status, although males, those who have full employment, and those with more formal education also show more participation through political action.

### *Generations and Religious Values*

The political transition in Spain implied not only a great change in political institutions and processes, but, as was said at the beginning of this chapter, a great and significant change regarding the role of the Catholic Church in Spain. With respect to political values, the change had already started during the 1960s, although it manifested itself more clearly after 1975. The secularization process has affected religious beliefs and practices.

An index of religious beliefs has been constructed on the basis of eight beliefs which are common to both Catholics and Protestants: belief in God, in life after death, in the existence of a soul, in hell, in heaven, in sin, in reincarnation and in the devil. It is observed that, in each of the four waves with only one exception, religious beliefs are greater among the oldest generations, and lower among the youngest generations. Moreover, the religious beliefs of different generations diminished between 1981 and 1990, but have increased between 1990 and 1995, something that was already anticipated at the beginning of this chapter when trying to explain the reasons for the decline in secular/rational values (and therefore the increase in traditional values) in 1995. Religious values in 2000 for each generation are the lowest of the whole period.

Table 9. Index of religious beliefs, by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	4.94	4.65	4.76	3.48
1922–1936	4.45	4.30	4.52	3.26
1937–1951	3.95	3.56	3.91	2.71
1952–1966	3.10	2.88	3.60	2.39
1967–1981	–	2.96	3.41	2.08

Table 10. Importance of God in one's life, by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	7.47	7.41	7.98	7.42
1922–1936	6.75	7.14	7.59	7.06
1937–1951	6.36	6.39	7.35	6.44
1952–1966	5.19	5.19	6.25	5.63
1967–1981	–	5.16	6.16	4.86

A second, widely used indicator of religious beliefs is the 10-point scale that measures the subjective importance attributed to God in one's life. The data show, in all four waves, and without any exception, that the importance of God in one's life is less in each generation when compared with its predecessor. And, when examining the changes in time for each generation it is observed again that the importance of God decreases from 1981 to 1990, but increases in all generations in 1995 and decreases again in 2000.

It must be underlined that the rise in the importance of God in one's life in 1995 confirms once more that the reasons given to explain the change of trend in the traditional-rational/secular index were not mere artifact or justification. The "trad-rat" index dropped in 1995 towards the traditional axis, and many of the data examined here have confirmed that change in the trend with an increase in different traditional measurements. This indirect validation of the value change provides confidence in the data.

To summarize, it is important to measure both the change in religious practice or behavior, and not only the change in beliefs. The usual measure of religious practice is attendance at religious services, an indicator that, in Protestant countries, refers to church attendance for religious services generally on Sunday, and, in Catholic countries, generally refers to attendance at mass on Saturday or Sunday.

Once more, in all four waves and without exception, church attendance has decreased from the oldest to the youngest generations, a finding that is consistent with secularization theory. Also, in accordance with this theory, church attendance of each generation has declined consistently from 1981 to 1995, but it is evident that all generations seem to have increased their church attendance in 2000, with the sole exception of the youngest generation (1967–1981), which has continuously reduced its church attendance since 1990. There is not, at least at this time, a particular explanation for this increase in church attendance in 2000, a finding that will have to be followed up in future surveys.

Table 11. Attendance at religious services, by wave and generation

	1981	1990	1995	2000
1907–1921	5.90	5.46	5.12	5.32
1922–1936	5.23	5.16	4.80	5.10
1937–1951	4.44	4.45	4.19	4.52
1952–1966	3.52	3.10	3.31	3.48
1967–1981	–	3.10	3.04	2.87

### *Concluding Remarks*

The main hypothesis of this chapter has been that change in the two values dimensions defined by Inglehart as accompanying the processes of modernization and post-modernization –the traditional-rational/secular dimension and the scarcity/survival-self-expression dimension— may be observed in Spain not only in time, comparing data for four waves (1981, 1990, 1995 and 1999–2000), but also comparing the five generations from that born in 1907 to that born in 1981, grouped in 15 cohorts for each generation. Results seem to confirm this main hypothesis. Younger generations are generally more secular/rational oriented and more self-expression oriented, while older generations are generally more oriented towards traditional and scarcity/survival values. In general, the same pattern of change is observed when comparing values of each generation since 1981 to 2000, though here an exception is usually found in 1995, when a return to traditional values is observed.

To confirm and validate this twofold trend, a great deal of data on attitudes towards the family, gender equality, social exclusion, ideology, societal change, preference between equality and freedom, preference for different forms of government, political action, religious beliefs and religious practice have been. For the most part, the reported trends of change have been confirmed, and a modest return to more traditional values in 1995 has also been confirmed by many of these indicators, thus demonstrating that it is not a deviation that could be attributed to an error in sampling or in the items that form the traditional-secular/rational values index, but is a fact that is confirmed when using many other indicators.

As a concluding test, regression models have been estimated to test the predictive value of the two values dimension, the traditional-secular/rational values index, and the survival/scarcity-self-expression

values index, as predictors of the different dependent variables already tested against generation and wave as independent-predictive variables. Thus, the two value dimensions explain 21% of the variance in the index of traditional family orientation, so that traditional family orientation is positively related to traditional values and to scarcity values; they explain 9% of the gender equality index, so that gender equality is related to self-expression values and secular/rational values; they explain 6% of the total social exclusion index, implying a relation of this index with traditional and survival/scarcity values; they explain 18% of ideological self-anchoring, so that leftism is related to traditional and survival/scarcity values while rightism is related to rational/secular and self-expression values; they explain 4% of the variance in the preference for a democratic government, in such a way that it is related to self-expression and rational/secular values; they explain 29% of political action, implying a strong relationship with self-expression and rational/secular values; they explain 26% of religious beliefs, 48% of God's importance in one's life, and 25% of religious practice, so that they are related to traditional and survival/scarcity values. All these relationships are maintained when one controls for gender, education, employment status and social class.

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