

The journal *Nómadas. Revista Crítica de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas*, Complutense University of Madrid on-line's publication, which nowadays turns into the official EMUI's magazine under the title *Nomads. Mediterranean Perspectives*, it begins a second time navigation all over the Mediterranean, with the purpose of considering the fact itself of examining from the perspective of becoming a new project about the *Union for the Mediterranean*. This project replace the exhausted *Barcelona Process*. Economic, legal, cultural, political and social topics will be developed from an expansive and in-depth conception of the Mediterranean as a plurality of civilisations, cultures, languages and symbolical universes. By doing so, these topics will be structured, not so much as an alternative to globalisation –as some propose–, but as a cosmopolitan and tolerant vision demanded by an open-minded society.

The EMUI was founded in collaboration with the Complutense University of Madrid, host to our Spain campus, and an EU University Consortium. Officially launched in Malta on October 16th 2007 under the aegis of the Spanish Embassy in Malta, events were hosted at the Mediterranean Conference Centre. We were honoured with high-profile attendees including members of the Maltese Parliament and Government, the European Commission and Parliament, diplomats and representatives of the Spanish Government.



Complutense University of Madrid
European Academy of Yuste Foundation
Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation
European Union

01
2009/1

Mediterranean
Perspectives

NOMADS

Critical Review of Social and Juridical Sciences



NOMADS

Critical Review of Social and Juridical Sciences



ISSN 1889-7231

Mediterranean
Perspectives

Nr. 01 (2009/1)



Euro-Mediterranean University Institute (EMUI)
Complutense University of Madrid & Consortium



NOMADS

MEDITERRANEAN PERSPECTIVES

Critical Review of Social and Juridical Sciences

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Página web: www.plazayvaldes.es

ISSN: 1889-7231

D. L.:

NOMADS

MEDITERRANEAN PERSPECTIVES

Critical Review of Social and Juridical Sciences

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THE ROLE OF “THINKS TANKS” IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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THE ROLE OF THINK TANKS

In January 2009 the Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC)¹ organized the first international conference on the topic of “The Role of Think Tanks in Developing Countries: Challenges and Solutions”². The conference was organized around one International Forum on “Sharing worldwide experiences on the role of think tanks” and nine sessions on the following topics: 1) The independence of think tanks, 2) Factors challenging the role of think tanks, 3) The advocacy role of think tanks and multidisciplinary research, 4) Think tanks for the unheard: observatories for child rights, 5) Development oriented think tanks: German experience, 6) Measuring and assessing progress: international experiences of think tanks influencing policy, 7) The role of think tanks in shaping reform policies, 8) Value systems and decision support in developing countries, 9) Think tanks influencing political and economic policy: India and China experiences. Almost fifty papers were presented on those sessions, and more than fifty countries and international organizations from the five continents and world regions were represented either as speakers or participants.

¹ www.idsc.gov.eg

² www.thinktanking.idsc.gov.eg

Contrary to many other conferences, this one has had immediate follow up. There was a Cairo Declaration approved by the assembly that states the following goals: 1) Promoting the role of think tanks in developing countries to enhance good governance and decision making, 2) Bringing together and forging links among think tanks institutions in developed and developing countries, 3) Sharing research and ideas through a common website and regular biennial conferences and workshops, 4) Cooperating in capacity building, exchange of visiting scholars and training researchers, 5) Creating the basis for collaborative research projects and other related activities by pooling expertise, financing and other resources, 6) Engaging in national and international advocacy on issues of common interest. More specifically, the Cairo Declaration includes the establishment of a Network of Think Tanks for Developing Countries (NTTDC) of which all participant organizations at the conference have become Founding Members and, as such, members of its Steering Committee.

The role of IDSC in the promotion of the conference and the establishment and coordination of the Network (NTTDC) cannot be underestimated, and it may be foreseen that it will play a major role in contributing to the dialogue among peoples and cultures in the Mediterranean, and between developed and developing countries. In the pages that follow the paper presented in session 8 is reproduced.

Social research has contributed for decades to social, economic and political planning, as a necessary though not sufficient condition, to enlighten decision makers. Inasmuch as Think Tanks have an advisory and consultative function to those who have to take decisions, they can benefit largely from the analysis and interpretation of data collected through social research. At present there are a great number of international comparative research projects that provide huge amounts of data, often periodically, on a great variety of topics that should be of value to experts in Think Tanks. Some of these projects are global, world wide, as the World Values Study (WVS), the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), and others are limited to certain geographical or cultural areas, as the Eurobarometer, the Latinobarometer, the Afrobarometer, the East Asia Barometer, the Asia Barometer, the Arab Barometer, the European Values Study, the European Social Survey, the East Europe Barometer, etc. Their data are usually accessible in Data Archives, as Institute for Social Research³ (ISR, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.), Central Archive⁴ (GESIS-ZA, Cologne, Germany), UK Data Archive⁵ (U. of Essex, Colchester, UK), Norwegian Social Science Data Services⁶ (NSD, Bergen, Norway), and ASEP/JDS Data Bank⁷ (Madrid, Spain), among many other international and national data

³ www.isr.umich.edu

⁴ www.gesis.org

⁵ www.data-archive.ac.uk

⁶ www.nsd.uib.no

⁷ www.jdsurvey.net

archives. The growth of international comparative research in the past two or three decades has been favoured by new developments in computing technologies and, undoubtedly, by the rapid world-wide diffusion of internet. But data are data, that is, they are just the raw materials, and think tanks, consultants, analysts, and researchers in general, are more and more needed to derive knowledge about social reality that may be applied to formulate policies and, in general, to enlighten decision makers in many different areas. What Wright Mills called the “sociological imagination”⁸ continues to be even more necessary when information is as abundant as it is today.

Certainly social research had a major role in providing information to political leaders of very different ideologies during the political transition to democracy in Spain (before and after Franco’s death in 1975). Information about public opinion’s wishes and expectations was decisive for leaders to formulate their policies and strategies, and the success of that process is a good demonstration of how social research can contribute to difficult social, economic and political challenges. Social research has also played a very important role in East European countries to inform reforms in their public administrations after 1989⁹.

In the following pages an attempt is made to analyze some data on cultural values collected by the European Values Group and the World Values Survey Association on a number of countries in the Mediterranean. The main purpose is to show that, contrary to some ideological predictions about the so called “clash of civilizations” (Huntington), there are also many similarities in citizens’ values, attitudes, desires and expectations on both sides of the Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum as was named by the Romans. Having been part of the Group of Experts for the Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Space appointed by the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, a few years ago, I am very satisfied to see that our main proposal, the establishment of the Mediterranean Foundation, has successfully become a reality, and is located in Alexandria as the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures.

VALUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

It is difficult to define which countries should be included as belonging to the Mediterranean basin. The MENA region, as defined by the World Bank, may be taken as an approximation, but there are other different groupings. For the purpose of the following analysis

⁸ C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1959.

⁹ Sigma Project, *The Use of Public Opinion Surveys for Public Administration Reforms in East European Countries*, OECD, Paris, 1998.

we have preferred to use a more extensive definition, thus including some countries in the Middle East and in Central Asia for which survey data on values were available. The list of available surveys in countries around this broadly defined area is presented, by geographic-cultural area, in Annex I.

A summary of the available information is the following: 28 countries “close” to the Mediterranean, 5 waves along a period of more than 25 years, 70 surveys conducted by EVS and WVS classified in 6 territorial-cultural regions, and 99,893 personal interviews face to face.

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF R’S BY CULTURAL REGION AND WAVE

REGIONS	WAVE					
	1981-1984	1989-1993	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007	Total
West European	5,318	8,745	1,211	9,168	3,213	27,655
East European Orthodox	0	2,137	7,818	6,469	6,093	22,517
East European Christian	0	1,035	4,203	2,009	1,037	8,284
East European Islamic	0	0	4,201	2,200	0	6,401
Magreb	0	0	0	3,546	1,200	4,746
Middle East	0	1,030	1,907	15,189	10,965	29,091
Israel	0	0	0	1,199	0	1,199
Total	5,318	12,947	19,340	39,780	22,508	99,893

Certainly one could have grouped the countries in many other ways, as “North” and “South” Mediterranean, or as Christian and Islam, but previous analysis have demonstrated that reality is a little more complicated when using taxonomies. Ever since Merrit and Rokkan edited their classic book on Comparing Nations¹⁰, it has been confirmed many times that within-group differences are often greater than between-groups differences. Most of the analysis has been based on very simple statistics, arithmetic means to measure averages for countries, and standard deviations to measure variation around the means. And the attitudes and values that have been compared refer to different social, economic and political aspects.

As has been mentioned before, previous analyses have shown evidence confirming that within-world-regions variation may be larger than between-world-regions in four dimensions (economic, political, social and cultural development, as measured by GNP per capita, Freedom House Ratings, Human Development Index and post-materialist values), and

¹⁰ R. L. Merrit and S. Rokkan (eds.): *Comparing Nations, The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross –National Research*, New Haven: Yale University Press. 1966.

that the concept of “civilization” or “world region” as an homogeneous entity cannot be accepted uncritically¹¹. On the contrary, the country seems to be still a better unit of analysis for explaining individual attitudes in international comparative research. Nevertheless, the types of society defined as world cultural regions seem to have a significant explanatory power at the micro-level, that is, for explaining individuals’ attitudes. However, socio-economic differences among world regions (especially GNP differences) may explain differences in values in a similar and sometimes even greater degree than types of society or “civilizations” as Huntington defined them¹². And, at the micro-level, family income also seems to be the variable with greater explanatory power of individuals’ attitudes. The internal homogeneity of so called “civilizations” is therefore questioned by empirical evidence. In summary, differences (measured by arithmetic means) between countries belonging to the same “civilization” were in some cases greater than differences between “civilizations”.

In another piece of research comparing Elites and Non-Elites in developed and developing countries in the Mediterranean it was found that there is a great convergence of values between elites in developed and in non-developed countries (that is, between elites in European and Islamic countries in the Mediterranean) with respect to political and economic values, but a lack of convergence with respect to family and religious values¹³. But, when non-elites are compared, greater differences are found between European and Islamic Mediterranean countries, but more when family and religious values are compared than when the comparison refers to political and economic values.


The values that have been used in the present analysis refer to importance attributed to different institutions: family, work, politics and religion, to some other social values as happiness, national pride and interest in politics, to confidence in different institutions: churches or religious organizations, armed forces, the police, the justice system, the Government, political parties and Parliament. The six regions defined for this research have also been compared with respect to their preferences for four different types of government. And, finally, comparisons have also been made regarding identification of individuals with different territories or political organizations, and regarding the importance attributed to democracy and the evaluation of how democracy works in their own country.

¹¹ J. Díez-Nicolás, “Two contradictory hypotheses on globalization: social convergence or civilization differentiation and clash”, en R. Inglehart (ed.): *Human Values and Social Change*. Leiden-Boston: Brill. 2003.


¹² S. P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster. 1996.

¹³ J. Díez-Nicolás, “Value systems of elites and publics in the Mediterranean: convergence or divergence”, en Mansoor Moaddel, (ed.), *Values and perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern publics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007.


Importance of Family





Importance of Work



Importance of Politics



Importance of Religion



IMPORTANCE ATTRIBUTED TO DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS

Only the six main regions could be compared with respect to importance attributed to the four institutions, and not for the first wave of surveys on values in 1981. Israel could not be included in the analysis because it only conducted the 2000 wave, and even then it didn't include these questions (Annex II). Not all countries, and therefore all regions, can be measured in the other four waves, and the regions do not include the same countries in different waves, as has been shown in Annex I, because the countries participating in each wave of surveys have not always been the same. Nevertheless, one can notice some stability of measures through time, and also some similarities when comparing regions.

In fact, citizens in all six regions attribute a very high importance to the family, and the variation within each region is very low, as measured by the standard deviation (σ). All arithmetic means range between 3.76 and 3.97 (on a 4 points scale), which means practically no differences between regions in this respect. Importance attributed to work is also rather high and similar in all regions (it varies between 3.37 and 3.88) and the variation, though higher than with respect to the family, is still not high. But there is more variation with respect to religion. While Magreb and Middle East regions show averages above 3 points, the other regions attribute an importance between 2 and 3 points. And the variation within each region is much higher than in the two previous cases, to the point of showing coefficients of variation (standard deviation divided by the arithmetic mean as a percent of the mean) close to 50%. Higher variation means that while some individuals living in the countries included in each region attribute a great importance to religion, others attribute a low importance to it. But there seems to be a high consensus among all individuals, regardless of wave and region, in attributing a low importance to politics. Many averages are even below 2 points, and the coefficient of variation is often above 50%.

Some other conclusions can be derived from the data. First, with few exceptions, individuals living in Middle East, Magreb and East European Islamic countries seem to attribute more importance to each of the four institutions than citizens of the other three European regions, and this seems to be so in all waves. Second, as has already been mentioned, in almost all regions and waves family is given more importance than any other institution, followed by work, religion and politics. The only exceptions are the Middle East and Magreb in the 2000 and 2005 waves, where religion is given more importance than work, because of a decline of importance attributed to work and an increase of the importance attributed to religion.

OTHER SOCIAL VALUES

Citizens in Middle East and Magreb countries also seem to show greater national pride than citizens in other regions, and citizens in Middle East countries also seem to be more interested in politics than citizens of other regions, and more or less consistently through time. But West European citizens seem to be somewhat happier than citizens in all other regions, especially in the last two waves of 2000 and 2005 (Annex III). Citizens in all regions, however, show higher national pride than happiness, and much lower interest in politics, but the variation coefficients with respect to interest in politics are the highest (the standard deviation is around 50% of the arithmetic mean), while those regarding happiness are the lowest (around 25%). And changes through time in each country are not large in any case, showing high stability. It must be underlined that the low interest in politics is coherent with the low importance attributed to politics.

It must be underlined that these are the only cases in which there is data for Israel, though only for the 2000 wave. Citizens in Israel rank as the second most happy country, only a little less than West Europeans. They have less national pride than citizens in Magreb, Middle East and West European countries. And they show the highest interest in politics, though interest is low in all regions and countries included in this analysis.

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

In Annex IV confidence in different institutions is shown. The three Islamic regions, Middle East, Magreb and East European Islamic, in general show higher confidence in any institution than the other three regions. Another salient finding is that confidence in any institution seems to be declining among those living in countries included in the East European Islamic region, while the contrary seems to be true in Magreb countries. In general it may be seen that citizens in the East European Christian region are the ones that have the less confidence in most institutions.

The most distinctive pattern that is found, however, is the great variation in confidence of regions on each one of the seven institutions, with the only major exception of confidence on political parties, where one finds a rather low confidence (and lower variation around the average rating), shared by individuals in all regions. Somewhat similar comments might be made with respect to confidence in the government and in parliament.

Apart from that it has been found that the ranking of institutions according to the confidence awarded to each one of them varies greatly from region to region. In this case variation among regions is quite large and significant. In fact, citizens of West Europe and East

European Christian countries have the largest confidence in the police and the armed forces, while Churches or other religious organizations receive the highest confidence among citizens of the Middle East.

PREFERENCES FOR TYPES OF GOVERNMENT

These results are presented in Annex V, and they show a very consistent pattern among regions and waves, though a large variation coefficient is maintained within each region, showing great differences among the individuals who live in each regional group of countries. Certainly there seems to be a very high consensus in preferring a democratic political system over the other three types of government. In all six regions a similar pattern emerges, showing the greatest preference for a democratic political system and, in smaller degree, for having experts make decisions, while lower preferences are shown towards having a strong leader and, even less, towards having the army rule. Only in Middle East and Magreb countries there seems to be a slight higher preference for the army to rule than for having a strong leader.

Differences in these preferences, at the individual level, seem to be larger, as measured by the values of the standard deviations from the mean with regard to all four types of government.

SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH DIFFERENT POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL UNITS

Many different international or national surveys have demonstrated that most citizens in the world tend to identify themselves with the local community where they live and/or with the country itself, and certainly they identify themselves less with other territorial units or organizations, mostly political ones.

Data is available only for the 2005 wave, when the question was first included, though the question was not included in East European Islamic countries. A majority of citizens in all regions identify mainly with their country and only in the second place with the local community in which they live. The exception in this case is the Middle East, where identification with the Arab Union is the highest, even higher than with the country or the local community. No other significant differences have been found when comparing regions in this aspect. But the variation around the mean is in some regions higher than in others, representing at times more than 50% of the variance.

TABLE 2: SELF-IDENTIFICATION WITH EACH OF THE FOLLOWING POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL UNITS
(1 = STRONGLY DISAGREE 4 = STRONGLY AGREE)

	West European		East European Orthodox		East European Christian		Magreb		Middle East	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
World citizen	2.86	.83	2.78	.95	2.86	.80	2.39	1.01	2.93	.95
Local community	3.26	.66	3.29	.71	3.19	.66	3.14	.94	3.47	.65
Own country	3.43	.62	3.44	.68	3.39	.60	3.64	.53	3.63	.57
European Union	2.91	.74	2.69	.95	2.92	.73				
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)			2.47	.85						
Arab Magreb Union							2.69	.98		
Arab Union									3.74	.52
Autonomous individual	2.65	.99	2.97	.94	3.12	.77	1.66	.85	3.05	.98

THE MEANING AND PERFORMANCE OF DEMOCRACY

A democratic system of government seems to be preferred to any other type, as data has already shown. But one thing is the preference for democracy in general, and quite another thing is the evaluation that individuals make of it.

TABLE 3: IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATICNESS IN OWN COUNTRY
(1 = NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT/NOT AT ALL DEMOCRATIC
10 = ABSOLUTELY IMPORTANT/COMPLETELY DEMOCRATIC)

REGIONS	WAVE 2005-2007			
	Importance of Democracy		Democraticness in own Country	
	x	σ	x	σ
West European	8.66	1.67	6.64	2.14
East European Orthodox	8.27	2.13	5.44	2.30
East European Christian	7.91	2.28	5.83	2.18
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-
Magreb	8.93	1.86	4.99	1.88
Middle East	8.77	1.92	5.95	2.62
Total				

On the basis of a scale 1 to 10, citizens in all regions attach a very high importance to democracy, with means generally over 8 points (only slightly below in East European Chris-

tian countries). But the evaluation of the degree to which own country is democratic is much lower on the same scale 1 to 10, so that only in West European countries the mean is above 6 points, and in Magreb it is very slightly below 5 points. Besides, variation is much greater with respect to the evaluation of “democraticness” of own country than with respect to the importance attached to democracy. There is a convergence on ideals and desires, but not necessarily in self-appraisal of their reality.

WITHIN-GROUP DIFFERENCES AND BETWEEN-GROUPS DIFFERENCES: AN EXAMPLE

To finalize this analysis an example is presented to compare within-group and between-group differences. To that purpose countries within each region, for the 2005-2007 wave of values surveys have been selected, and their means and standard deviations have been calculated only for two variables, importance of the family and confidence in the United Nations.

**TABLE 4: IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE UNITED NATION,
BY REGION AND COUNTRY**
(1 = NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT/NONE AT ALL 4 = VERY IMPORTANT/A GREAT DEAL)

REGION Country	2005-2007 WAVE					
	IMPORTANCE OF FAMILY			CONFIDENCE IN UNITED NATIONS		
	x	σ	cv100	x	σ	cv100
WEST EUROPEAN	3.88	.37	10	2.56	.78	30
France	3.84	.45	12	2.50	.87	35
Italy	3.93	.29	7	2.60	.77	30
Spain	3.88	.36	9	2.58	.71	28
<i>Ratio High/Low (countries)</i>	<i>1.02</i>			<i>1.04</i>		
EAST EUROPEAN ORTHODOX	3.88	.37	10	2.40	.91	38
Bulgaria	3.88	.38	10	2.61	.87	33
Cyprus	3.94	.29	7	2.27	.98	43
Moldova	3.82	.43	11	2.45	.90	37
Romania	3.85	.40	10	2.66	.83	31
Serbia	3.93	.28	7	2.00	.83	42
<i>Ratio High/Low (countries)</i>	<i>1.03</i>			<i>1.33</i>		
MIDDLE EAST	3.96	.24	6	2.03	1.00	49
Iran	3.93	.32	8	2.45	.86	35
Iraq	3.96	.23	6	1.47	.88	60
Egypt	3.98	.16	4	2.07	.98	47
Jordan	3.96	.23	6	2.20	1.16	53
Turkey	3.98	.17	4	1.97	.95	48
<i>Ratio High/Low (countries)</i>	<i>1.01</i>			<i>1.66</i>		
RATIO HIGH/LOW (REGIONS)	1.02			1.26		

The purpose of this example is to show that variation in values is different, both when comparing averages for groups of countries (regions) or when comparing averages for individuals within each country, depending on what values are being dealt with. Thus, it is evident that there is much more variance regarding confidence in the United Nations than regarding the importance attached to the family. There is also more variation within France than within the Western European region in the two variables, more variation within Moldova and Romania regarding the importance of the family than within the East European Orthodox region, and more variation within Cyprus than within that region as a whole with respect to confidence in the UN.

Similarly, there is less variation regarding the importance of the family within the Middle East region than within the West European and the East European Orthodox region, but when focusing on confidence in the United Nations it is evident that there is much more variation within the Middle East region and much less variation within the West European region.

The main conclusion seems to be, confirming previous analysis, that there seems to be no evidence of homogeneity within so called “civilizations”, nor even within smaller territorial or cultural regions as the ones that have been compared here. Thus, differences in values within a country may be larger than differences between countries, and even larger than differences between regions. Using large compound units of analysis as civilizations, geographical areas, cultural areas based on language or religion or any other aspect, generally hide the larger variations one may find within a country. As was reported in another research, elites in different countries on the Mediterranean basin, and when comparing developed and developing countries, seem to share very similar values, while non-elites differ much more between themselves. Therefore, individual properties seem to be more important to explain differences and variations in values than group properties.

ANNEX I

DISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE COUNTRY SURVEYS BY WAVE AND REGION*

REGIONS	WAVE				
	1981-1984	1989-1993	1994-1999	1999-2004	2005-2007
West European	France Italy Malta Spain	France Italy Malta Portugal Spain I Spain II	Spain	France Greece Italy Malta Portugal Spain I Spain II	France Italy Spain
East European Orthodox		Bulgaria Romania	Bulgaria Georgia Moldova Romania Macedonia Serbia + Mont.	Bulgaria Moldova Romania Macedonia Serbia + Mont.	Bulgaria Cyprus Moldova Romania Serbia
East European Christian		Slovenia	Armenia Croatia Slovenia	Croatia Slovenia	Slovenia
East European Islamic			Albania Azerbaijan Bosnia + Herze.	Albania Bosnia + Herze.	
Magreb				Algeria Morocco I Morocco II	Morocco
Middle East		Turkey	Turkey	Iran Iraq Jordan Saudi Arabia Turkey I Turkey II Egypt	Iran Iraq Jordan Turkey Egypt
Israel				Israel	

Source: European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423,2006. Surveys designed and executed by the European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain and Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and GESIS, Cologne, Germany.

ANNEX II**Importance Attributed to Different Institutions, by region and wave**

(1 = Not at all important, 2 = Not very important, 3 = Rather important, 4 = Very important)

How important is FAMILY in your life...

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	3.79	.46	3.81	.43	3.86	.39	3.88	.37
East European Orthodox	-	-	3.76	.51	3.88	.38	3.88	.38	3.88	.37
East European Christian	-	-	3.78	.49	3.82	.46	3.78	.48	3.86	.44
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	3.90	.34	3.97	.19	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.92	.32	3.95	.24
Middle East	-	-	3.86	.38	3.97	.21	3.96	.24	3.96	.24

How important is WORK in your life...

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	3.53	.65	3.46	.76	3.56	.66	3.49	.70
East European Orthodox	-	-	3.56	.64	3.45	.81	3.49	.74	3.39	.78
East European Christian	-	-	3.70	.54	3.53	.65	3.50	.59	3.37	.69
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	3.61	.65	3.66	.76	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.88	.43	3.82	.49
Middle East	-	-	3.41	.84	3.72	.59	3.62	.73	3.56	.76

How important is POLITICS in your life...

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	1.91	.91	1.88	.95	2.09	.91	2.22	.93
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.15	.93	2.10	.95	2.11	.89	1.99	.89
East European Christian	-	-	2.06	.84	2.17	.93	1.96	.80	1.81	.79
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.22	.92	2.12	.97	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.09	1.06	2.13	1.00
Middle East	-	-	2.00	1.00	2.53	1.11	2.40	1.07	2.43	1.08

How important is RELIGION in your life...

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	2.64	1.04	2.69	1.00	2.74	1.04	2.50	1.05
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.59	1.10	2.90	1.00	2.95	.94	3.06	.93
East European Christian	-	-	2.38	1.02	2.67	1.00	2.59	.96	2.32	1.02
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.99	.86	2.85	1.00	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.92	.31	3.89	.37
Middle East	-	-	3.40	.88	3.64	.74	3.82	.52	3.86	.46

ANNEX III**Happiness, National Pride and Interest in Politics****(1 = Lowest 4 = Highest)****HAPPINESS**

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	2.98	.63	3.03	.64	3.05	.59	3.05	.66	3.12	.59
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.49	.74	2.65	.74	2.64	.74	2.70	.81
East European Christian	-	-	2.62	.71	2.68	.70	2.93	.64	2.97	.67
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.73	.69	2.82	.77	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.01	.72	3.03	.72
Middle East	-	-	3.08	.75	3.37	.73	2.93	.83	2.86	.76
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.02	.79	-	-

NATIONAL PRIDE

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	3.83	.87	3.28	.77	3.55	.73	3.42	.71	3.34	.69
East European Orthodox	-	-	3.17	.87	3.34	.79	3.07	.94	3.19	.80
East European Christian	-	-	3.46	.74	3.29	.82	3.34	.73	3.46	.71
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	3.49	.70	3.29	.89	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.79	.53	3.48	.68
Middle East	-	-	3.57	.68	3.70	.64	3.67	.66	3.69	.57
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.35	.84	-	-

INTEREST IN POLITICS

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	1.94	.94	1.86	.95	2.08	.93	2.14	.91
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.36	.96	2.26	.90	2.38	.88	2.16	.91
East European Christian	-	-	2.56	.90	2.39	.90	2.23	.88	2.22	.91
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.30	.91	2.24	.93	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.82	.90	2.05	.97
Middle East	-	-	2.29	1.00	2.58	.98	2.37	1.02	2.29	.99
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.87	.92	-	-

ANNEX IV**Confidence in Institutions**

(1 = None at all, 2 = Not very much, 3 = Quite a lot, 4 = A great deal)

Confidence in CHURCHES

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	2.63	1.07	2.61	1.03	2.49	.96	2.67	1.00	2.46	.96
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.56	1.08	2.77	1.02	2.71	.99	2.96	.95
East European Christian	-	-	2.30	.98	2.65	.98	2.47	.95	2.21	.91
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.80	.86	2.67	.99	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.73	.62	3.50	.70
Middle East	-	-	2.92	1.02	2.67	1.05	3.24	.93	3.22	.86

Confidence in ARMED FORCES

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	2.58	.97	2.34	.88	2.33	.87	2.59	.86	2.65	.83
East European Orthodox	-	-	3.01	.84	2.73	.94	2.75	.95	2.79	.91
East European Christian	-	-	2.35	.90	2.83	.90	2.51	.82	2.27	.80
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.82	.80	2.64	.88	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.96	1.10	2.90	.95
Middle East	-	-	3.48	.72	3.59	.68	3.09	.94	3.03	.98

Confidence in POLICE

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	2.69	.88	2.48	.83	2.63	.81	2.62	.82	2.76	.75
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.43	.87	2.23	.92	2.33	.89	2.35	.92
East European Christian	-	-	2.51	.84	2.34	.90	2.46	.77	2.30	.76
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.72	.85	2.73	.84	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.62	1.08	2.75	.97
Middle East	-	-	2.78	1.04	2.84	1.04	3.03	.99	2.97	.92

Confidence in the JUSTICE SYSTEM

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	2.49	.85	2.37	.83	2.43	.80	2.29	.85	2.43	.80
East European Orthodox	-	-	2.47	.90	2.34	.90	2.19	.92	2.24	.90
East European Christian	-	-	2.53	.87	2.26	.86	2.28	.92	2.18	.77
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.61	.78	-	-	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.81	.96
Middle East	-	-	2.81	.97	2.86	.98	2.57	1.10	2.87	.93

THE ROLE OF “THINK TANKS” IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Confidence in GOVERNMENT

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	2.10	.80	2.11	.80	2.39	.82	2.16	.79
East European Orthodox	-	-	-	-	2.23	.91	1.99	.91	2.15	.87
East European Christian	-	-	-	-	2.35	.89	-	-	2.07	.70
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.96	.82	2.37	.89	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.57	1.08	2.62	.95
Middle East	-	-	2.44	1.04	2.30	1.07	2.57	1.04	2.78	1.02

Confidence in POLITICAL PARTIES

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	2.55	.70	1.90	.72	2.11	.72	1.96	.72
East European Orthodox	-	-	-	-	1.90	.80	1.86	.75	1.85	.79
East European Christian	-	-	-	-	1.85	.74	-	-	1.78	.62
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.38	.88	1.94	.77	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.69	.89	2.18	.94
Middle East	-	-	-	-	1.93	.89	2.14	1.00	2.12	.86

Confidence in PARLIAMENT

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West Euro- pean	2.37	.89	2.23	.82	2.20	.80	2.29	.82	2.28	.77
East Euro- pean Ortho- dox	-	-	2.17	.89	2.11	.88	1.92	.87	2.01	.85
East Euro- pean Chris- tian	-	-	2.26	.80	2.09	.86	2.03	.77	1.93	.68
East Euro- pean Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.75	.79	2.16	.83	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.86	.98	2.41	.94
Middle East	-	-	2.67	1.06	2.35	1.05	2.57	1.06	2.60	.93

ANNEX V**Preference for Types of Government**

(1 = Very bad, 2 = Fairly bad, 3 = Fairly good, 4 = Very good)

Political System: HAVING A STRONG LEADER

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	-	-	2.05	.89	1.80	.91	1.92	.94
East European Orthodox	-	-	-	-	2.60	1.07	2.37	1.10	2.67	1.01
East European Christian	-	-	-	-	2.22	1.03	1.75	.85	1.76	.90
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.20	.92	2.04	.94	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.86	1.09	1.87	1.04
Middle East	-	-	-	-	2.20	.92	2.23	1.07	2.15	1.07

Political System: HAVING EXPERTS MAKE DECISIONS

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West European	-	-	-	-	2.55	.91	2.26	.95	2.35	.94
East European Orthodox	-	-	-	-	2.80	.89	3.97	.80	2.87	.86
East European Christian	-	-	-	-	2.84	.86	3.10	.73	2.99	.78
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	2.38	1.05	3.02	.78	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.99	1.00	3.16	.91
Middle East	-	-	-	-	2.54	.79	2.88	.94	2.96	.91

Political System: HAVING THE ARMY RULE

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West Euro- pean	-	-	-	-	1.51	.71	1.37	.65	1.47	.74
East Euro- pean Ortho- dox	-	-	-	-	1.59	.83	1.69	.87	1.83	.88
East Euro- pean Chris- tian	-	-	-	-	1.60	.82	1.35	.59	1.30	.59
East Euro- pean Islamic	-	-	-	-	1.97	1.05	1.53	.75	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.61	.90	2.02	1.00
Middle East	-	-	-	-	2.03	.83	2.32	1.08	2.28	1.02

Political System: HAVING A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM

REGIONS	WAVE									
	1981-1984		1989-1993		1994-1999		1999-2004		2005-2007	
	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ	x	σ
West Euro- pean	-	-	-	-	3.38	.65	3.50	.66	3.50	.65
East European Orthodox	-	-	-	-	3.31	.76	3.32	.75	3.35	.74
East European Christian	-	-	-	-	3.32	.73	3.41	.65	3.31	.78
East European Islamic	-	-	-	-	3.52	.60	3.46	.64	-	-
Magreb	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.65	.66	3.70	.56
Middle East	-	-	-	-	3.38	.68	3.46	.70	3.52	.67