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Publicado en: Environmental Protection in the 1990s.
Senior Management Seminar 8-9 October. La Haya:
CONCAWE, 1987, pp. 1-13.

"Changing Social Values"

Speech by

Professor J. Díez Nicolás
Complutense University of Madrid

SENMAN/R 9/87
23.10.87

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THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXT

The assertion that the world is going through a period of accelerated social change has become so topical that it risks losing its original strength and appeal. But, nevertheless, it is a true assertion, and one that probably explains the growing interest, in recent decades, to anticipate and even predict the future.

It may be appropriate to remember that the decade of the '60s was one of generalised optimism, of faith in the capacity of mankind to solve its problems and to provide freedom and prosperity, justice and welfare, to all human beings. The decade started with the launching of the first man-made satellites around the earth, and ended with the landing of the first man on the moon, a great event which, through a miracle of technology, was watched on TV by millions of persons throughout the world as it was happening. The spectacular results of economic development in industrialised countries, only two decades after the end of World War II, brought many people to the wrong conclusions that development could be easily achieved by all nations in a rather short period of time, provided they followed the same path that more developed countries had followed.

The most important economists of those years believed in the idea of "development for everybody and everywhere", like Rostow, who travelled from country to country spreading the "good news" of the stages of economic growth, Galbraith and his technostructure in the affluent society, Heilbroner and the great ascent, and even a re-discovered Schumpeter, whose writings of the '30s and '40s became best-sellers again. Public opinion accepted development as irreversible in those countries which had already achieved it, and as attainable, in the short or medium range, in those countries which had not yet achieved it.

Prospective and future oriented writings of the '60s generally shared two main assumptions: continuous technological development and continuous economic (and by implication, social) development. If Marxism had proposed the utopian goal of a classless society, capitalism seemed to formulate the alternative utopian goal of mass consumption societies. Public opinion and political leaders were, for the most part, happily immersed in the traditional faith in continuous, linear, ever-increasing progress, so frequent in the history of Western political and sociological thought.

The mythical year 2000 became the target towards which many of the books published during the '60s were oriented. Among them, Herman Kahn and Antony Wiener's The year 2000 is probably the best known example. With the help of a large team of experts at the Hudson Institute, and on the basis of five main variables (population, education, GNP, energy sources and military power) they worked out their long range multiple base trend. Positive or optimistic aspects certainly predominated in this long range trend, to the point that only one with clear negative or pessimistic implications was mentioned: the growth of massive destruction weapons. It is true that the foreseen future is at times more pessimistic in some of their eight world scenarios, especially on the fragmented ones, but the optimistic perspective clearly predominates, in accordance with the most generalised opinion trends of those years.

A less known study, but in my opinion not less important, was conducted by the Vienna Centre for Information, Documentation and Coordination in the Social

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Sciences, under the title Images of the World in the Year 2000. This study, which focused on anticipated changes in social structures, individual attitudes and social behaviours, was based on empirical research conducted on around twenty very different countries around the world at the end of the '60s, for which reason the optimistic outlook is again predominant. One of the main objectives of the study was to obtain a greater knowledge about the relationship between some structural and individual variables and certain attitudes and behaviours, so as to anticipate changes on attitudes and behaviours on the basis of predicted changes on the structural and individual variables. The aim was therefore to infer the future from individual expectations and desires about different outcomes.

One of the main authors of the study suggests that, due to the dialectical nature of society, there is no relationship between what people believe will happen and what really happens, because prediction itself may originate self-fulfilling or self-defeating forces. In his opinion, the future, as a comprehensible dimension, does not exist. Three main conclusions may be derived from this study: the importance attributed to the nation-state as main actor in the future world theatre, the lack of imagination to depart from the real world in which we live, and the contradiction between capacities and motivations. With respect to the latter, it is interesting to underline that, while the most influential predict events that they do not desire to occur, the less influential desire events which they do not expect. The apparent pessimism of minorities at that time seemed to correspond, at the national level, with some fatigue about development observed in the more developed countries, and it constitutes, in my opinion, one of the most important findings of the study, since it certainly was a prelude to what was to happen some years later.

In fact, the decade of the '70s may be considered, especially in the more developed world, as a predominantly pessimistic decade. Preoccupations seemed to derive mainly from three sources: accelerated world population growth, accelerated diminishing resources, and growing degradation of the natural as well as the socio-cultural environment.

Signs of social movements not very favourable to development had already appeared by the late '60s. Thus, radical socio-political movements grew around new values and ideals: Marcuse, "the cultural revolution", Mao's "red book", and a growing concern about the natural environment, as well as a growing rejection of development, consumption, and the "establishment", were just some of the more visible examples of more profound changes that were taking place in society, more specifically in Western industrial societies. It is in this context that many voices arose, years before the crisis of 1973, to call the attention of governments and public opinion to the dangers that were threatening mankind. Examples of the growing concern about the undesired effects of development on the environment are the well known Destruction of the Biological Equilibrium (Voigt), The Manifest for Survival (Goldsmith), or even Toffler's Eco-spasm Report. Some announced the coming of new Middle Ages, and others, like Commoner, talked about an environmental crisis, a crisis for survival.

There were also some more optimistic forecasts, however, like Daniel Bell's Post Industrial Society, which presented a future characterised by a more rational society, based on scientific knowledge, in which technology will solve the main social problems, and where technocrats will rule over more egalitarian societies in which social mobility will be based on individual merit.

But other forecasts were closer to what really happened only a few months later. Thus, the first report to the Club of Rome, The Limits to Growth, was published by Meadows in 1972, following the previous world model elaborated by Forrester, and only one year before the economic crisis of 1973. This study, which was the first one to call attention to some of the dangers threatening mankind on a world wide basis, represented a daring counterpoint to Kahn's or Bell's more optimistic forecasts.

The Limits to Growth met many criticisms, some of which, like Cole's Thinking about the Future, were also very scientifically based. However, when the Club of Rome was meeting in Tokyo to examine and, if necessary, to revise Meadows's report, the first oil and economic crisis of 1973 emerged, becoming the most important challenge to the theory of continuous development for all.

Meadows and the Club of Rome not only rejected the previous criticisms, but reaffirmed themselves through another report, What Limits?, in which they concluded that before the world reaches its material, economic limits, it will be stopped by the social and political unadaptation of our societies, to the point that the likely social conflicts may be of such a magnitude that economic problems will be obscured.

Other well known international or national reports apart from other club of Rome reports, like the U.N. Reports on the Social Situation of the World, The Global 2000 Report to the President of the U.S., O.E.C.D.'s Interfutures Reports, and many others, seem to agree on the main problems facing the world today:

- (1) growing world population, though the rate of growth has been slightly reduced during the last ten years, and increasing concentration of the population in urban places;
- (2) diminishing natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, and degradation of the physical and natural environment;
- (3) danger of no increase, and even of a decrease, in the quality of life, because of the greater population pressure on resources;
- (4) increasing social expectations and demands of the populations on their governments, due to increasing education and to mass media;
- (5) high rates of unemployment and inflation, due to industrial reconversion, international economic relations, rising costs of production and distribution, etc.;
- (6) increasing economic and social inequalities, both between countries and within countries;
- (7) increasing social tensions and conflicts, latent or manifest, both between countries and within countries.

The latest world report, Our Common Future, elaborated under the guidance of Prime Minister Brundtland from Norway, for the present meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, is not more optimistic. This report insists on each one of the previously mentioned issues, and concludes that "the changes in attitudes, social values and social aims which this report intends to stimulate, will depend on large scale educational campaigns, debates and public participation".

Nobody seems to doubt that social tensions which might probably derive from the present situation will produce very important changes in social institutions. Heilbroner, Hirsch and Bennett, to mention but a few, have also insisted repeatedly about the consequences of the present crisis on the social aspects of everyday life. Scarcity, says Bennett, will characterise societies in the near future, but it will be a type of scarcity, in many ways, based on affluence. The individual is frustrated by scarcity, but he tries to reduce it through scarce goods and/or services.

In any case, there seem to be only three main ways in which mankind may respond to the foreseen scarcity of resources:

- (1) to establish stronger regulatory mechanisms, in order to control our personal consumption, our use of resources and, eventually, our desires and needs;
- (2) to let things more or less as they are, until Hirsch's social limits to growth manifest themselves;
- (3) to conduct appropriate research in order to arrive at a new moral definition of needs and of the human use of the earth and its products.

Bennett concludes that "each country, each individual, will have to experience frustrations and deprivations before they can control growth, and that will take a very long time".

My own tentative conclusion, at this point, is that social and economic structures have an influence on prevailing and future attitudes, but at the same time are also influenced by them.

A quick evaluation of our recent past seems to provide some evidence of how public opinion, individual attitudes and social behaviour are influenced by the social, economic and political context which prevails at any particular time. Thus, motivation to achieve, economic security, confidence about the future, seem to have been attitudes positively related to the development process which took place in most Western countries during the '60s. But the sudden rise in oil prices in 1973 caused not only important economic objective changes at the national and international levels, but great changes in attitudes and behaviour far beyond what might have been anticipated.

To take the example of environment protection, it must be remembered that, when economic growth and affluence were still at their peak, national and international public opinion and political leaders showed great concern about the need to take into consideration the qualitative, and not only the quantitative, aspects of development, including protection of the natural environment. Environmental Committees were established in most international bodies at the end of the '60s and beginning of the '70s (OECD, Council of Europe, U.N.-ECE, UNESCO, and very especially UNEP), and many industrial countries established Environment Departments or Agencies at very high political and/or administrative levels, as well as parliamentary committees on environment, etc. At the same time, environmental movements began to be organised in many industrial countries, obtaining in some of them a significant support from the population, as well as a positive response from political parties.

However, the crisis of 1973 meant, among many other things, a reduction of budgets allocated to environmental programs. Attention shifted in a very short time from a high concern about environmental problems to a higher concern about unemployment, rising prices, and about maintaining the level of living that development had made possible. This shift of concern has been observed not only at international and national political-administrative levels, but also at the individual level. Public opinion showed greater concern about the qualitative aspects of life when the quantitative aspects were rather well guaranteed. But, as the quantitative aspects were threatened, public opinion gave them again a higher priority, as empirical research conducted after the crisis in many industrialised countries has demonstrated. Economic growth is once more above environment protection on the priorities of governments, political elites and public opinion, and this may explain the recent growth of environmental and/or ecological political parties. The apparent paradox might be interpreted as a need for the environmental movement to find its own political voice, once it seems evident that major political parties have awarded their environmental programs a lower priority than they have to new programs and/or policies to reactivate economic activity.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, should try to shake again governmental and public opinion, to help them realise the true and important threats that mankind is presently facing. The report mentions specifically the continuous heating of the earth, the dangers for the ozone layer surrounding the globe, and the desertification process which invades agricultural lands. But special attention should be awarded to the assertion that "ecology and economy are increasingly interrelated, to the point of having created a network of causes and effects which cannot be separated".

Most of the problems which the world is facing today relate to population, environment, technology, or social organisation. Curiously enough, these are the four elements of the ecosystems, as defined by modern human ecology. According to this theoretical frame of reference, human populations survive on their environment through cultural adaptation, that is, through technology (material culture) and social organisation (non-material culture), in such a way that each one of these elements is interrelated with the other three, being at the same time dependent and contingent on each one of the other three elements.

Though this is not the appropriate occasion to discuss the ecosystem model, it may be relevant to remember that, in recent years, more and more experts are insisting on the idea that the most important threats for mankind relate to social organisation, that the social limits to growth may be reached earlier than the economic, material limits. It is therefore important to focus on the role of social values, attitudes and collective behaviour, because they not only reflect prevailing conditions, but are also contingent on changes in social organisation (institutions and processes), as well as on changes in the other elements of the ecosystem.

CHANGING SOCIAL VALUES

The study of social values and attitudes is receiving increased attention not only from social scientists, but also from political leaders and business captains. As a consequence of the very important changes that have taken place in

the technology of transportation and communication, ideas are spreading around the world in shorter and shorter time periods. Isomorphism, on a world basis, is a product of increasing interdependence, mainly economic interdependence, among all the countries of the world. But isomorphism in economic structures generally leads to isomorphism in political and social structures as well. And, given the strong relationship between economic, political and social structures, on the one hand, and attitudes and opinions, on the other, it is not surprising to find an increasing similarity of social movements, life styles, and even social values and attitudes throughout the world, and especially within large regions of the world.

If optimism, economic security and confidence about the future were common in most Western publics during the '60s, lack of economic security (both at the individual and national levels), and a greater concern about the future, are now common in most Western publics.

Taking the European family as an example, experts have shown enough evidence to demonstrate that present trends on family and household formation, composition, and dissolution, are very similar throughout Europe, with a certain tendency towards convergence. As a matter of fact, differences among countries may be smaller than differences among regions within a particular country. But most important, evidence also exists to demonstrate that social values and attitudes towards the family, as well as towards processes which have a direct influence upon it, show a clear tendency to converge on a similar pattern in most European countries.

If one accepts that social values and attitudes are instrumental in human adaptation to environment (as part of the non-material^⑥ cultural adaptive response), it must be derived that increasing isomorphism in structures (economic, social, political, etc.) will have to be accompanied by a certain isomorphism in social values and attitudes as well.

There is plenty of evidence to demonstrate the tendency towards similar social values and attitudes among European populations in recent years, especially when this similarity is compared with the greater diversity observed, also among European countries, in the previously mentioned international comparative research on the Images of the World in the Year 2000.

In a long trend study which Ronald Inglehart has been conducting since the early 1970's, based on data from the Eurobarometer, the similarity of expressed attitudes with respect to national goals and priorities, among the publics of European countries, is quite clear and evident.

Inglehart's main hypothesis is that the values of Western publics have been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on the quality of life. The silent revolution which provides the title to his well known book consists of a change from what he calls materialistic culture to a new post-materialistic one, that is, from a culture which attaches higher priority to the satisfaction of physiological needs (sustenance or economic needs and safety or personal security needs), to another culture which attaches higher priority to the satisfaction of social and self-actualisation needs (belonging and esteem, intellectual and aesthetic).

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The argument would be that modern industrial societies (Western societies) have attained a degree of economic and technological development which allows them to satisfy the sustenance (economic) needs of a large (and increasing) proportion of their population.

In addition, a large (and increasing) proportion of the population, in fact all those below 42 years of age, were born after the end of World War II, and therefore have had no personal direct experience of total war.

The conclusion would be that, once Western publics have internalised the rather uncommon situation, on historical perspective, of having attained economic and personal security, they turn to a desire to satisfy other needs, like greater participation in those decisions which relate to their job, to their community, to their government, greater concern for the environment they live in, greater concern for civic rights and personal freedoms, and in general, greater interest in the social, political, intellectual and aesthetic aspects of life.

Consistent with this line of argument, those social groups who have reached economic and personal security earlier and more solidly should be closer to the post-materialistic than to the materialistic pole. And, certainly, the data provided by Inglehart for nine European countries and the United States in 1970 and 1973 support, for the most part, the main hypothesis and derivations. Thus, the younger age groups are relatively more post-materialistic oriented than the aged, and higher socio-economic strata also seem to be more post-materialistic, in relative terms, than the lower strata (less education, less income, less occupational prestige).

Some of the criticisms to the materialistic/post-materialistic hypothesis have pointed out that it is a product of the optimistic perspective of the '60s, that is, of the situation in Western countries before the crisis of 1973, (the data, as has been mentioned, were collected in 1970 and 1973), and that it would not hold after the crisis.

It must be remembered, nevertheless, that the data on which Inglehart tries to verify his argument show, unequivocally, that materialistic culture is still predominant in Western publics, as may be observed in Table 1. Thus, using a total of twelve items (three relating to economic goals, three to safety, three to belonging and three to self-actualisation), there is no doubt that economic and safety goals are predominant over belonging and self-actualisation goals, not only when the means of the nine European countries are contemplated, but also when data for individual countries are considered, (with some exceptions like France and The Netherlands). Data for the United States and Spain also fit the general pattern just described (though Spanish data were collected long after the crisis, in 1987).

It must also be remembered that Inglehart does not pretend to assert that Western publics are already post-materialistic, but rather, that they are shifting towards post-materialism gradually, and that some social groups, (those more inclined to accept social change), are relatively closer to the post-materialistic pole.

In addition, it must also be said that, in more recent publications, in which he has been able to use survey data collected on European countries after 1973, there seems to be no evidence (as criticisms would suggest) of a significant

return to more materialistic values. On the contrary, the main hypothesis seems to be sustained, though with more specifications.

Using a very similar methodology, I have been able to collect data on Spain during the first half of 1987. The results are very much in agreement with Inglehart's hypothesis. In fact, choosing from a list of nine goals, only one of which (fight terrorism) was new, Spaniards awarded higher priorities to materialistic ones, like other Europeans. And analysis of the data also provides concluding evidence that younger age groups and higher socio-economic strata seem to be more post-materialistic, in relative terms, than older cohorts and lower socio-economic strata.

In comparing both sets of data, however, some relevant factors should be emphasised. First, the clearly higher priority accorded by Spaniards to personal security (fight terrorism and fight crime), which are the first two goals selected. By comparison, eight European countries and the United States give first priority to an economic item, and only Denmark and The Netherlands give first priority to a safety item, and Belgium, Italy and the U.S. give second priority to "fight crime". This prevalence of personal security in Spain must be explained by the phenomenon of terrorism, which has been the main threat to Spanish peaceful political transition, and also to the growth of delinquency in recent years, which has been substantial in relative terms when compared with the not so distant past.

Secondly, the very low priority accorded to "strong defence forces" in all European countries, Spain included, may be due, as Inglehart suggests, to the lack of direct experience of "total war" of increasingly larger portions of the population, and probably to the growth of "pacifist, anti-nuclear movements". (Only the U.S. seems to be slightly exceptional, maybe on account of its recent participation in Vietnam and its leading position as one of the two military super-powers in the world).

Third, it is quite significant to observe the very low priority given to the only environmental item: "more beautiful cities", which certainly does not correspond to the apparent growth in public concern over the qualitative aspects of life. Only Belgium, The Netherlands and the U.S. seem to care a little bit more about environment, always in relative terms.

On a second wave of the Spanish survey, four of the nine items were replaced by new ones. Thus, "less impersonal society", "ideas count", "more beautiful cities" and "strong defence forces" were replaced by "fight unemployment", "more just society", "avoid social conflicts" and "good international relations". The data confirmed once more the preference for materialistic goals, so that "fight unemployment" was mentioned as the most important or second most important goal by 60% of the interviewees, followed by "fight terrorism" (37%) and "fight crime" (27%). The relationship between age and socio-economic status with the materialistic/post-materialistic continuum again confirmed the original hypotheses. And two of the new items, "avoid social conflicts" and "good international relations" were awarded the lowest priorities.

Some further conclusions to be derived from the Spanish survey might be the following. In the first place, though a great coherence is observed among all Western countries, including the U.S. and Spain, it seems quite evident that national peculiarities at each particular time must be taken into consideration.

The fact that Spain has the highest unemployment rate, as well as the highest terrorism rate, among the countries under consideration, certainly explains the high priority awarded to both items. An implication of this assertion is that, if international comparisons are envisaged, a careful selection of the items to be included is highly necessary, to avoid those that may be very culturally or time bound.

Inglehart's suggestion as to the differences among social segments with respect to their position on the materialistic/post-materialistic continuum led me to further test his hypothesis through the use of a theoretical frame of reference proposed by Galtung two decades ago to explain the formation and change of attitudes, and which I have repeatedly used with good explanatory results on several occasions. The theory is better known as the centre-periphery model, and it has demonstrated its value to explain the diffusion of attitudes and opinions throughout society.

Briefly stated, the social position index constitutes a summary measure of several variables which define the position of an individual in society (sex, age, occupation, income, education, economic activity, ecological habitat and geographical centrality), in the sense that certain positions are more rewarded by society than others. According to this assumption, the social centre is composed of individuals who occupy more socially rewarded positions, while the social periphery includes all those individuals who occupy less socially rewarded (and even rejected) positions.

Theory would suggest, and empirical evidence has supported, that the centre would show a greater degree of social participation, a greater degree of knowledge (especially about policies), and a greater degree of opinion (especially about policies). Since the centre has greater access to mass media, and more things to communicate (knowledge, opinions), the communication process should follow the sequence from centre to periphery.

This is important to explain attitude formation. The theoretical model would seem to be:

- (1) lack of knowledge and, consequently, of evaluation;
- (2) acquisition of knowledge, with no evaluation; and
- (3) knowledge and evaluation.

A typical sequence in the process of transmission and internalisation of attitudes would be:

- (1) ideas are born in the centre and communicated to the periphery;
- (2) the centre starts discussion and the periphery remains apathetic;
- (3) ideas are implemented and new social structures are born;
- (4) the centre searches for new ideas, and the periphery starts to internalise what has already been institutionalised and accepted;
- (5) the centre proposes new solutions, the periphery resists them, defending the status quo;

- (6) the centre goes ahead and implements the idea, the periphery ends up accepting it once it has been socially institutionalised.

According to a slightly different model, if the periphery holds certain very basic moral ideas (derived from religion or other very ideological beliefs), it will defend the status quo or some new order, depending on what are its moral principles with respect to a given issue.

But, irrespective of what model is selected, the centre will tend to evaluate alternatives in a differential manner, individually, while the periphery will tend to make global evaluations, which leads to different orientations of centre and periphery towards social change. Therefore, with respect to the scope, the duration and the initiation of social change, the periphery (more absolutist, based on a more deductive and moralistic intellectual style) will prefer it to be total, rapid and immediate, while the centre (more gradualist, based on a more inductive, pragmatic intellectual style) will prefer it to be partial, slow and postponed.

Data on goals according to social position are presented in Table 2, and it is clearly observed how:

- (1) "fight terrorism" and "fight crime" are goals whose priorities decline sharply from periphery to centre. They can be classified as important goals for the social periphery, but the centre apparently attaches to them a relative lower priority;
- (2) "stable economy" and "economic growth" are clearly social centre issues;
- (3) "more say on job" and "less impersonal society" are also social centre goals;
- (4) "ideas count" seems to be breaking through as a goal that might be important in the future, but "more beautiful cities" and "strong defence forces" seem to be goals with a very low priority for everybody.

In summary, it seems convenient and possible to draw some conclusions:

- (1) Western publics are going through a process of substantial change ^{of an} (to) their value system;
- (2) though the major part of European societies are mainly concerned with issues that could be labelled as materialistic (economic and personal security), significant minorities are already more concerned about post-materialistic goals (belongings, intellectual and aesthetic);
- (3) evidence seems to support the hypothesis that Western societies are therefore shifting from a more materialistic culture to a more post-materialistic one;
- (4) data seem to demonstrate that the shift is being experienced differently by different segments of the population. In general, those who have acquired earlier and more solidly their economic and personal security, that is, those who are closer to the social centre, who are also more in favour of social change and innovation, will show relatively more post-materialistic values;

- (5) finally, the situation may be difficult for present governments in Western countries. Though they may be aware of the shift in orientation from materialistic to post-materialistic goals in the social centre (the dominant minorities who lead public opinion), they must also take into account the still greater prevalence of materialistic goals among the majority of the population, the social periphery, especially because of the persistent threat of unemployment and inflation which Western economies have suffered since 1973. As Inglehart put it, "if they do not solve current economic problems, they risk losing the support of the Materialist majority of their citizens". This tension may explain the apparent loss of interest, on the part of Western governments, on qualitative policies (including environmental programs) and in favour of quantitative policies (reactivation of the economy).

TABLE 1

Goals of Western Publics, 1.973
(Percent choosing given goal as 1st and 2nd most important out of twelve)

Goal	Country												Mean		
	Belgium	France	Luxem- bourg	Germany	Nether- lands	Denmark	Britain	Ireland	Italy	European Countries	United States	Spain		***	
Fight rising prices (E)*	52	43	29	44	26	24	50	44	41	39	25	-	39%	25%	-%
Economic growth (E)	19	18	33	24	14	23	29	29	31	24	16	16	24	16	16
Fight crime (S)	21	20	9	21	26	21	17	25	37	22	21	39	22	22	39
Stable economy (E)	12	12	22	39	16	28	25	24	16	22	21	28	22	21	28
Maintain order (S)	10	21	28	18	18	31	11	16	17	19	20	-	19	20	-
More say on job (B)	18	13	22	12	24	20	15	20	9	17	16	21	17	16	21
Less impersonal society (B)	17	28	11	11	26	17	12	8	14	16	12	20	16	12	20
More say in government (B)	11	9	19	9	14	8	15	15	11	12	16	-	12	16	-
Protect free speech (A)	17	14	7	11	13	11	11	6	9	11	10	-	11	10	-
More beautiful cities (A)	15	9	7	4	10	7	6	5	3	7	18	9	7	18	9
Ideas count (A)	7	11	9	3	10	7	4	3	5	7	8	13	7	8	13
Strong defense forces (S)	2	3	3	5	4	2	6	6	7	4	16	3	4	16	3
Fight terrorism (S)**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40

Source: R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution, Princeton University Press, N.J., 1.977

* Letters in parentheses indicate category of the given goal: (E)=Economic, (S)=Safety, (B)=Belonging, (A)=Self Actualization.

** This item was included only in the Spanish survey.

*** Data for Spain were collected by ASEP in 1.987 with a national sample, and are part of an on-going research by the author of this paper. Only nine items were included as potential goals to be chosen by interviewees.

TABLE 2

Goals of Spanish Publics, 1.987, by Social Position

	Total Sample	Social Position				
		Very Low	Low	Middle	High	Very High
Economic Growth (E)	8%	5%	5%	8%	11%	15%
Strong defense forces(S)	1	*	2	1	1	1
More say on job (B)	11	8	10	11	12	13
More beautiful cities (A)	5	4	6	5	4	4
Stable economy (E)	14	8	11	15	18	20
Fight crime (S)	18	18	21	18	14	10
Fight terrorism (S)	19	25	23	20	14	9
Less impersonal society (B)	11	4	8	11	15	18
Ideas count (A)	7	4	5	8	10	9
NA	6	23	11	5	2	1